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The accident rate has not been decreasing in 
the chemical process industry although 
almost all the accidents (>95%) do have 
known causes and could have been 
prevented by using existing knowledge. This 
shows that the existing knowledge was not 
used effectively to prevent accidents. The 
aim of the thesis is to transform the accident 
report information into practical 
applications by analyzing it and creating an 
approach that can be used for supporting the 
design activities. 
The thesis has presented new knowledge on 
the statistics of equipment based accident 
contributors, their background, the design 
errors involved and their timing and 
proposes a method for extended experience 
feedback to improve the dissemination of 
accident knowledge. The proposed method 
utilizes knowledge of earlier accident cases 
and a design lifecycle point of view. This 
makes it possible to start hazard 
identiﬁcation in the early stages of plant 
design that lead to cost and safety beneﬁts as 
a result of early process design changes. 
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1 Introduction 
 
 
1.1 Background 
 
In the last decade, considerable resources have been used for creating accident 
reporting systems. The aim of these systems was to collect accident information that 
would provide a better understanding on the causes of accidents and to create lessons 
learned as well as make recommendations for accident prevention. However, major 
accidents still occur in the chemical process industry (CPI). The accident rate in the 
CPI has been increasing or is still a constant phenomena in the USA (Prem et al., 
2010), in Asia (Hasegawa, 2004; He et al., 2011) and also in Europe (Niemitz, 2010). 
It seems that the current safety management and design methods are insufficient to 
prevent accidents in the CPI. Further improvements in the process safety and design 
are still needed. 
 
The safety problems are related to the changes in the industry. The level of risk has 
increased in the CPI in the last decade due to the complexity of operations (Qi et al., 
2011). At the same time, the problems could be due to the economic downturn and 
tight competition, major restructuring and cost cutting programs which are being 
implemented for the companies/plants to remain competitive. These factors have led 
to outsourcing and increased workload. At the same time, the safety knowledge within 
the organization is drained-off due to staff restructuring, retirement etc. All of these 
factors influence the safety performance by eroding the safety margins which were in 
the design and operation in the beginning. The capability of process to maintain 
functioning in a safe state after a disturbance can be called ’resilience’. The gradual 
changes are slowly eroding this capability (Pasman, 2010). The term resilience was 
originally introduced by Hollnagel et al. (2006) as well as the approach called 
‘resilience engineering’ to provide methods for measuring and improving the 
resilience. 
 
At the same time, as the organizations are potentially losing their safety knowledge 
and experience due to the lack of the application of knowledge lessons learnt from 
accidents i.e. safety databases are inefficient. It has been claimed that the accidents 
occur or recur due to poor dissemination of accident information and learning from 
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these accidents due to fact that many did not know how to prevent the accidents from 
recurring (Kletz, 1993). 95% of accident causes are known, foreseeable and could 
have been prevented by using the existing knowledge (Drogaris, 1993a). However, 
similar accidents tend to recur within a five-year interval (Mannan et al., 2010).  
 
The third issue discussed in the thesis is the shift in risk management approach used 
for loss prevention. In the early years of industrialization, loss prevention was based 
on technical safety. In 1960s and 1970s, several technical/design-based safety 
methods were implemented such as Hazard and Operability Study (HAZOP) and 
Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA). However, in the late 1970s and till today, the 
approach for loss prevention shifted from technical oriented to human and 
management oriented such as safety management systems (SMS) (Knegtering and 
Pasman, 2009). The focus on the outer layers of protection (LOP) is based on the 
assumptions that the chemical plant is well designed, existing process hazards are 
accepted and humans have been asked to be more careful at the workplace. Although 
the SMS approach is effective in improving the overall safety awareness at work, it 
doesn’t reduce process hazards. Relying on SMS is also problematic when the 
organization does not have enough safety knowledge (Kletz, 2003; Paradies, 2011). 
 
The outer layers of LOP (the active engineered and procedural strategies) do not 
control process hazard in comparison to inner layers an inherently safer strategy. 
However, due to its conceptual/general approach, the process developers/designers 
often ignored the inherently safer strategy (Kletz, 1999). They believed that the 
process hazard is unavoidable and can be controlled effectively through add-on safety 
protection systems (Hendershot, 2011).  
 
As the number of accidents in the CPI has not decreased, the issue to be addressed is 
if the current safety promotion approaches are sufficient. The option of should the 
technical and design related reasons of accidents be reviewed since they seem to be 
dominant based on earlier studies (Drogaris (1993ab) and Taylor (2007ab). There is 
also the question of should the focus be more on the hazard reduction through inner 
layers of LOP concerning the more fundamental design oriented aspects. Then, there 
is the consideration as to what should be done to promote the usage of existing safety 
information such as the lesson learnt from earlier accidents.  
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There is a lack of studies on this area and little is known about the technical and 
design reasons of accidents, e.g. what are the typical design errors made and in which 
process lifecycle stages do the errors take place. The rationale for this study is to 
understand the reasons of accidents from the perspectives of technical, design and 
operation error throughout the process design lifecycle. Deeper understanding of the 
root causes of accidents would facilitate early detection of accidents which may 
prevent similar accidents from taking place in the CPI. 
 
1.2 Aim of the study 
 
The purpose of the study is to identify the accident contributors and analyze their 
frequency. Deeper analyses are carried out to find out their root reasons, 
interdependence and characteristics of different types of equipment. The aim is to 
create a hazard identification approach based on frequency of accident contributors by 
locating the common errors made during the plant design and operation lifecycle 
stages. The following tasks carried out are as follows:  
i. Statistical analysis of main and sub contributors for various accident elements 
and the root causes.  
ii. Analysis on interdependence of main and sub contributors causing accidents. 
iii. Identification of high-risk contributors to accidents. 
iv. Identification of typical design errors in the CPI. 
v. Identification of time of occurrence of design errors in a typical plant design 
lifecycle. 
vi. Development of a design oriented safety method for accident contributor 
identification.  
 
The thesis is organized into four main sections, which include introduction (Chapters 
1 – 4), research approach (Chapter 5), statistical analysis of accident cases and 
dissemination of accident information into design (Chapters 6 – 11), and discussion 
and conclusion (Chapter 12).  
 
The introduction section comprises the chapters 1-4. Chapter 1 provides the 
background of the research work. In Chapter 2, the fundamental elements of process 
safety are introduced. Chapter 3 discusses the current issues in lessons learnt from 
accidents and experience feedback system. The learning cycle is reviewed and their 
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weaknesses are identified. Chapter 4 summarizes the usual plant design phases, 
design tasks and decisions for typical chemical process plant design. The basic safety 
and design considerations throughout process lifecycle are discussed. 
 
The section on research approach or chapter 5 describes the methodology used and 
how the accident information is disseminated into design process. Chapters 6, 7, 8, 
and 9 present the analysis of accident contributors with reference to technical and 
human and organizational contributors. In Chapter 10, discussion on how accident 
knowledge gathered is incorporated into the design of an oriented safety method. 
Enhancement of inherent safety measures based on corrective actions taken by the 
CPI is presented in Chapter 11. Discussion and conclusion are in Chapter 12. 
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2 Process Safety 
 
 
2.1 Definitions for safety terms 
 
A number of process safety terms used in this work is defined to support the 
understanding of the thesis:  
 Accident: the occurrence of a sequence of unwanted events that produced 
unintended injury, death or property damage (CCPS, 1999). 
 Accident contributor: an agent that is responsible in causing an accident. 
 Accident main contributor: an agent that is responsible for triggering the 
accident. 
 Accident sub contributor: a supporting or co-agent in causing an accident. 
 Design technical contributor: any design related error (technical or human) made 
during design activity: including designed procedures and operator-technical 
interface errors.  
 Design error: a design error is deemed to have occurred, if the design or operating 
procedures are changed after an incident has occurred (Taylor, 1975). 
 Hazard: a chemical or physical condition that has the potential to cause damage 
(Crowl and Louvar, 2011).  
 Human and organizational contributor: purely operation-based human and 
organizational fault in the operation stage of process lifecycle. 
 Operator-technical interface error: the error that is not strictly design error but 
can cause operators to make a mistake. 
 Origin of error: time of occurrence of design error during design activity when 
the final decision is made. 
 Risk: a measure concerning both the likelihood and magnitude of loss (Crowl and 
Louvar, 2011). 
 Safety or loss prevention: the prevention of accidents through appropriate hazard 
identification, risk assessment and control strategies (Crowl and Louvar, 2011).  
 
2.2 Legal requirements on process safety 
 
The case histories of Seveso and Flixborough had a great impact on the current legal 
requirements of the CPI operations. Seveso Directive I was gazetted in the EU in 
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1982 and improved further in 1996 as Seveso Directive II. The legislation clearly 
states that the plant owner is responsible for controlling the process hazards. Through 
this legal requirement, every chemical facility is required to furnish the process safety 
information and demonstrate that appropriate action has been taken to prevent major 
accidents. With regards to Seveso II Directive, for a new establishment, a safety 
report must be sent to a Competent Authority within a ‘reasonable period of time’ 
prior to the start of construction or operation.  
 
However, current safety and health framework such as OSHA 29 (OSHA, 1993) does 
not have the requirements to recognize, avoid or control hazards during the early 
phase of plant design project (Wincek, 2011). As a result of this requirement, most of 
the companies conduct full safety evaluation at the detailed design phase. 
Furthermore, a late formal safety evaluation makes the fundamental or major design 
changes difficult to be carried out.  
 
2.3 Hazard, risk and layers of protection 
 
Losses can be reduced by diminishing risks. The level of risks can be reduced by 
decreasing or managing hazards through having add-on or administrative systems 
within the layer of protection (LOP) approach as illustrated in Figure 1.  
 
Figure 1: Layers of protection (LOP). 
Process Hazards 
Procedural:  
e.g. training, work instruction, permit etc. 
Inherent safety 
e.g. low inventory, small, simpler etc. 
Add-on engineered:  
active e.g. relief devices, controls etc. 
Add-on engineered:  
passive e.g. dikes, fire wall etc. 
Remaining Risk 
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As seen from Figure 1, hazards refer to the hazard potential such as fire, explosion 
and toxic release which are typically found in chemical processing plants. Process 
hazards are managed by an inherently safer design (ISD) such as process 
intensification, inventory reduction, etc. Add-on layers can be divided into passive 
and active engineered categories. Passive engineered strategy employs systems that 
do not perform any fundamental operation and remain static in default condition such 
as dikes and blast or separation walls. Meanwhile, the active engineered strategy 
utilizes safety devices that respond to the process changes such as process controls, 
alarm systems and pressure relief valves. The outer layer of LOP involves procedural 
strategies. Procedural strategy focuses on organizational and human control by 
establishing work instructions and use of personal protective equipment.  
 
The process hazards at chemical facilities need to be managed effectively and must be 
in accordance with the legislation, social responsibility, company image, and cost 
factors as unsafe operations would not be profitable in the long run. The steps in risk 
management and safety promotion include the hazard identification, risk assessment 
and control. Firstly, all possible process hazards need to be identified. Secondly, the 
risks of an accident should be estimated based on its likelihood and consequence. 
Subsequently, appropriate actions should be taken to eliminate and control the process 
risk as much as possible. 
 
An overall approach to managing the process risks in hierarchical order would be 
inherently safer as well as having add-on protection and procedural system as 
summarized in Figure 2. In loss prevention, the main strategy is to implement inherent 
safety for process hazards avoidance and control at source. This is in contrast to the 
traditional risk reduction strategy that relies on engineered add-on protection systems. 
However, the opportunity to implement inherent safety decreases as the design 
proceeds. The best time to implement ISD is during the research and development, 
and preliminary engineering because many of the decisions are conceptual and 
fundamental during these stages (Hurme and Rahman, 2005). 
 
The layer of protection acts on three functional factors of chemical plants: 
technical/design, operation related human factors and management factors (Figure 3). 
These factors have interfaces, which are operator technical interface, inspection-
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maintenance programs and safety promotion in operation. Statistical analyses confirm 
that the accidents in the CPI are contributed by organizational, human and technical 
faults (Sales et al., 2007; Jacobson et al., 2010). Technical contributors include 
equipment/component failures, lack of analysis, design related errors, etc. Figure 3 
presents the main classification of accident contributors and the responsible parties. 
 
 
Figure 2: The design approach in risk management in CPI.  
 
 
 
 
 
1. Hazard 
Identification 
2. Risk 
Assessment 
3. Risk Control 
- Assess hazards according to their likelihood & consequences based 
on worst-case scenario. 
- Existing method: Risk matrix, Quantitative Risk Assessment 
(QRA), Layer of Protection Analysis (LOPA), Fault Tree Analysis 
(FTA), and Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) etc. 
- Identify all process hazards i.e. fire, explosion, toxic release etc. 
- Existing method: Checklists, Hazard and Operability Studies 
(HAZOP), Dow Fire and Explosion Index (F&EI), Dow Chemical 
Exposure Index (CEI), What-If Analysis, Preliminary Hazard 
Analysis (PHA) etc. 
a) Inherently 
safer  
b) Add-on 
(passive 
engineered) 
c) Add-on 
(active 
engineered) 
d) Procedural 
Premier strategy for hazards avoidance and 
control at sources through design changes by 
using keywords i.e. minimize, moderate, 
simplify, substitute, error tolerance, etc. 
Add-on strategies to further reduce the 
likelihood and consequences of accident by 
using passive safety protection equipment i.e. 
dikes, containment, fire wall, etc. 
Additional add-on strategies to further reduce 
the likelihood and consequences of accident by 
using active safety protection systems: relief 
valves, controllers, detectors & alarms, etc. 
Human and organizational oriented strategies 
for safe operations: training, supervision, 
procedure, work instruction, inspection, 
maintenance, etc. 
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Figure 3: Accident contributors in CPI. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Safety 
Promotion in 
Operation 
Inspection/ 
Maintenance 
Operator 
Technical 
Interface 
Human 
Factors 
(Operator) 
Organizational 
Factors 
(Manager) 
Technical 
Factors 
(Designer) 
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3  Accident Databases and Learning from 
Accidents  
 
 
3.1  Accident databases 
 
Reporting of abnormal main events is encouraged (Meel et al., 2007) and it is part of 
the requirements in the Seveso Directive II as a result of catastrophic accidents such 
as Flixborough, Seveso, Bhopal, Piper Alpha, etc. Several national and international 
accident databases have been created for dissemination of accident information such 
as Major Accident Reporting System (MARS) managed by EU; Failure Knowledge 
Database (FKD) managed by Japan & Science Technology (JST) Agency, Japan; and 
Major Hazard Incident Data Service (MHIDAS) managed by Health Safety Executive 
(HSE), UK. Recently, a new and available accident database has been developed 
called Pondicherry University Process Industry Accident Database (PUPAD) (Tauseef 
et al., 2011) which contains nearly 8000 accident cases collected from 41 existing 
open source accident databases. 
 
Accident databases have some limitations in terms of accessibility, contents and 
accuracy. Although some of these accident databases are open-source and accessible 
through the Internet, their use is subject to certain terms and conditions. A number of 
these databases are developed and maintained by a service provider are not freely 
accessible such as MHIDAS. Besides that, a database is not perfect as there are some 
accidents that had been wrongly investigated, reported or classified (Kletz, 2009; 
Tauseef et al., 2011). This will affect the analysis results and accuracy of the 
generated lessons learnt from these accidents. 
 
3.2 Learning from accidents 
 
As mentioned in Chapter 1, accidents recur due to not addressing the lessons learnt 
from the earlier accidents. Many efforts have been done to analyze the cause of 
accidents and to generate corrective actions for effective accident preventions in the 
CPI. As a result, many journal papers, books and accident databases have been 
produced to support lessons learnt from accidents. However, a recent study found out 
that only one third of the accident cases studied is considered to provide lessons learnt 
on a broader basis (Jacobsson et al., 2010).  
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The level of learning depends very much on the quality of accident reports i.e. the raw 
data used for the analysis. Good accident data are essential for correct accident 
knowledge creation that would enhance process safety knowledge. Based on the 
knowledge management hierarchy of Ackoff (1989), the accident knowledge 
generated using the analyses of the number of accident cases give a better 
understanding of why accidents occur and how they can be prevented compared to the 
use of a report of single accident cases. The hierarchy of knowledge applied to 
accident analysis is presented in Figure 4.  
 
In this thesis, focus is on the selection of a suitable accident database and how to carry 
out a deeper analysis on the causes of accident to create useful accident knowledge for 
better understanding of the causes of accidents. The causes were analyzed by 
calculating the frequency and general knowledge obtained about the causes of 
accidents for several types of equipment. The outcome of the research would be an 
approach to identify accident contributor which would be used to propose a method to 
enhance chemical process safety. 
 
Figure 4: Knowledge hierarchy based on accident prevention perspective 
UNDERSTANDING 
Raw accident data  
Accident description 
Accident reports with 
analyses 
Implement and using accident prevention 
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WISDOM 
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KNOWLEDGE 
INFORMATION 
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3.3 Experience feedback system 
 
In recent years, more studies on learning from feedbacks based on experience have 
been conducted in the CPI; however, most of them were related to lessons learnt from 
accidents (Jacobsson et al., 2010; Kletz, 2004) or from near miss cases (Prem et al., 
2010). The circle of experience from the feedback system (Figure 5) consists of 
several elements namely: (a) accident, (b) accident investigation and reporting, (c) 
data collection, (d) data analysis/ processing, (e) lesson learnt, (f) information 
dissemination/distribution, (g) solution/decision on prevention measures, and (h) 
implementation (Kjellen, 2000).  
 
The current cycle of learning system is not sufficient to prevent accidents due to poor 
input quality, lack of analysis, poor dissemination and insufficient use of information 
to prevent accidents (Kletz, 2009; Lindberg et al., 2010). The weakest link of 
feedback based on experience in the process learning cycle is related to dissemination 
of accident information (Lindberg and Hansson, 2006). Majority of the research on 
experience feedback is related to accident investigation and not much on 
dissemination of information (Lindberg et al., 2010). Therefore, the main challenge is 
how to disseminate the accident information effectively and translate the current 
knowledge into practice (Bell and Healey, 2006). 
 
There are several approaches to actively disseminate accident information into the 
CPI which include the use of physical means (i.e. accident reports, journals); 
electronic means (accident report in databases); and the development of accident-
based safety/design tools. Disseminating accident information through physical means 
is less effective, compared to accident databases which have a good data retrieving 
system (He at el., 2011; Tauseef et al., 2011). However both these approaches 
represent lower level information in the knowledge hierarchy compared to analyzed 
knowledge which is proposed in the thesis. 
 
3.4 Dissemination of accident information 
 
Although accident analysis using accident databases is an active research agenda in 
the CPI, the utilization of the lessons learnt to prevent accidents is slow. The format 
of accident information (e.g. accident reports) is not user-friendly to the practitioners 
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especially process engineers and designers. The search for a safer design option by 
using the current format of accident information is very demanding and time 
consuming.  
 
Currently, the only method on accident analysis would be to search relevant accident 
cases found in the literature or databases during design work. On the contrary, past 
accident-based design approaches for detecting and eliminating design errors are not 
available (Taylor, 2007a). Past experience can be introduced in safety studies through 
HAZOP, which can indirectly draw upon lessons learnt from earlier related accidents. 
The results of the lessons learnt from these accidents are dependent on the expertise of 
the team members.  
 
The current experience feedback system needs to be modified, so that it can be 
systematically integrated with risk analysis methods (Lindberg et al., 2010; Jorgensen, 
2008). Therefore in this thesis, the information dissemination part of experience 
feedback system was implemented by creating a design oriented safety tool in Paper 
V. Figure 5 illustrates the design-based experience feedback system for a safer design 
and operation of chemical process plants.  
 
Dissemination and utilization of accident information into a design oriented safety 
tool development is placed at a higher level of knowledge management hierarchy 
(Figure 4) in comparison to accident reports or databases. At this level, the tools do 
not present only case studies, but contain deeper knowledge and understanding of 
accident causes and their interdependence which is done by analyzing many accident 
cases. The potential methods of reusing accident knowledge are: 
 Case-based reasoning: retrieval of similar database data and its adaptation to 
current problem (Heikkilä et al., 1998). 
 Human experience based utilization through HAZOP study. 
 Analysis of database information and its representation as a higher level 
knowledge and method is discussed in Papers I-V. 
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Figure 5: Learning from accidents based experience feedback system. 
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4 Safety Considerations in Design 
 
 
4.1 Plant design phases  
 
A chemical plant design undergoes a series of phases. Usually, the design of the plant 
starts from research and development, followed by preliminary process design, basic 
engineering, detailed engineering, construction and start-up, plant operation, retrofit, 
and decommissioning. Each design phase has specific design objectives, tasks, and 
decisions as presented in Table 1 (Refer Paper III).  
 
As the project starts, the chemical process route is either acquired or developed during 
the research and development phase which is based on experimental and modeling 
data. In this step, the process concept from laboratory to pilot plant is developed. In 
the preliminary design, the process concept is defined, process alternatives are 
identified, material and heat balances are calculated, and flow sheet diagrams are 
generated.  
 
In the basic engineering phase, details of the process package are determined. Process 
package contains process flow sheet, piping and instrumentation diagrams (PID), 
equipment specifications, and process description. Process data for all the equipment, 
piping, control system, and utilities needed are decided and provided as input 
information for the detailed engineering phase. The detailed PID is developed and the 
detailed equipment and instrument specifications are finalized. Then, HAZOP is 
carried out.  
 
Detailed engineering phase includes the design for construction comprising 
engineering disciplines such as mechanical, electrical, civil etc. Three dimensional 
plant layouts are developed and full process safety analyses are carried out. The 
process designer prepares the operating manual of the process which includes work 
procedures and instructions, safety and emergency guidelines of the process. The 
operation manual is prepared for process operation, process start-up and operator 
training. 
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Table 1: Typical characteristics of the design stages in the CPI (Paper III) 
 
Phase Target Main tasks and decisions Main safety issues 
 
Research and 
development  
 
Development of 
process concept and 
scale-up to 
industrial scale. 
 
- Idea generation and process 
creation/innovation. 
- Laboratory and simulation studies 
on reaction mechanism and kinetics. 
- Examination of raw materials (pure 
and industrial grade). 
- Laboratory & reaction calorimeter 
tests.  
- Process alternatives generation 
- Bench and pilot scale tests. 
- Market survey. 
- Legal and patent check. 
 
- Use of hazardous material as feedstock. 
- Fail to choose the safer state of feedstock. 
- Incorrect data on the reaction kinetic and reaction 
behavior. 
- Incorrect data on runaway reaction potential. 
- Overlook the chemical reactivity and 
incompatibility. 
- Underestimate the effect of impurity, by-product 
and contaminants. 
- Unclear mechanism to control the 
unwanted/runaway reaction. 
- Inaccurate scale-up. 
 
 
Preliminary 
engineering 
Preliminary process 
design for the 
feasibility study. 
- Process concept selection and flow 
sheet development. 
- Selection of unit operations. 
- Preliminary sizing of equipment. 
- Preliminary selection of 
construction material. 
- Site selection. 
- Final feed/product specifications. 
- Feasibility study. 
 
 
- Complicated and extreme routes selection (high 
temperature and pressure). 
- Unsuitable types of unit operations. 
- Unsafe operating conditions. 
- Overlook the chemical reactivity and 
incompatibility at process equipment level. 
- Lack of safety analysis on the chemical 
contaminations. 
 
Basic 
engineering 
Creation of the 
process data for 
detailed 
engineering. 
- Detailed process design and 
optimization. 
- Process design of equipment and 
piping system. 
- Basic automation and 
instrumentation engineering. 
- Preliminary layout design. 
- Utilities design.  
- Waste minimization. 
- Hazard and operability study.  
- Inappropriate layout, positioning and physical 
arrangement. 
- Incompatible heat transfer medium. 
- Incorrect heating/cooling sizing. 
- Inadequate safety and process protection. 
- Wrong or inaccurate process data for equipment 
- Unsuitable material of construction. 
- Failing to consider corrosive environment. 
- Inappropriate mechanical/ physical and chemical 
resistance specification. 
- Incorrect material flow set-up. 
- Lack of safety analysis. 
 
 
Detailed 
engineering 
Design of the 
physical process 
(equipment, piping 
etc.) for 
acquisitions and 
construction. 
 
- Detailed piping design. 
- Detailed layout design. 
- Instrumentation and automation 
design.  
- Mechanical design of the 
equipment. 
- Structural and civil engineering. 
- Electrical design. 
- Design of utilities/services. 
 
- Inappropriate piping layout and protection. 
- Inappropriate internal shape of 
equipment/component. 
- Incorrect location and positioning of support/ 
attachment/ venting of process equipment. 
- Inadequate electrical, mechanical and structural/ 
foundation specification. 
- Inadequate static, lightning and ignition sources 
control. 
- Inadequate detection, automation and 
instrumentation. 
- Inadequate operating, start-up, shutdown and 
emergency manuals. 
- Wrong specification of ‘buy item’. 
- No back up for utilities failure. 
 
 
Procurement, 
fabrication, 
commissioning 
and start-up 
Acquisitions, 
construction and 
installation of the 
process. Starting up 
the process and 
make it to meet the 
specification. 
- Contracting and bidding. 
- Contractor selection. 
- Procurement. 
- Installation. 
- Inspection. 
- Testing. 
- Field changes. 
- Part or components miss-match. 
- Wrong installation or poor work quality. 
- Incorrect positioning of sensor/ instruments. 
- Accessibility. 
- Lack of monitoring and supervision of contractor. 
- Miscommunication between designer, contractors 
and plant owner. 
 
 
Operation/ 
Plant 
modification 
Safe operations 
within design 
specifications and 
capacity. 
Improvement of the 
process.  
- Selection of safe operation and 
maintenance principles. 
- Gathering experience. 
- Process optimization. 
- Process improvement  
- Record keeping on plant histories 
and technological up-date. 
 
- Poor planning. 
- Lack of safety analysis. 
- Lack of technical and reaction knowledge. 
- Poor safety culture. 
- Poor inspection and maintenance. 
- Poor management of change. 
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In the construction phase, the chemical plant is built as designed. In the start-up 
phase, the process starts and the test runs are made. In the operation phase, the plant is 
operated and maintained according to guidelines. Since the plant requires 
improvement or capacity increase, modifications are made. The management of 
change is important during this stage of design. 
 
4.2 Safety evaluation during design 
 
A number of safety and design reviews are carried out throughout the process 
lifecycle. Their timing and techniques used may vary because engineering companies 
have a quality system which defines what is done and when it is done. In the 
literature, several publications discussed the methods used for hazard identification 
and risk assessment during chemical process plant design (Crawley and Tyler, 2003; 
Deshotels and Zimmerman, 1995; Kletz, 1991). They also listed the common methods 
used to evaluate the safety aspects at each plant design phase.  
 
The most common methods used in chemical plant design were checklists, HAZOP 
and hazard surveys such as Dow F&EI, and safety review (Crowl and Louvar, 2011; 
Seider et al., 2009). A checklist can be used throughout the process lifecycle, 
however, the other methods are intended mainly for the later stages of plant design; 
i.e. at basic and detailed engineering stages due to their need for information (Hurme 
and Rahman, 2005; Kidam et al., 2008a). In some firms, these checklists were used 
earlier but in an abridged form. Consequently, the safety evaluations are usually 
intervened quite late in the design (i.e. at basic or detailed design) where major design 
decisions on the process have already been made (Schupp et al., 2006).  
 
The existing safety review methods eliminate 80-95% of design errors (Taylor, 
2007a) but there is still a design element present in most (80%) of accidents in the 
chemical industry (Refer Paper III). Therefore, it is obvious that the current safety and 
design reviews have limitations. HAZOP is a typical method used for tens of years for 
finding safety and operational weaknesses in process plant design. It is based on the 
P&I diagrams and does not cover mechanical design errors. Dimensioning errors and 
problems arising during start-up & shut down are not well covered, as well as human 
or procedural errors (Duguid, 2001; Taylor, 2007b). The coverage has an average of 
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85% in those aspects which HAZOP should take into account but the average is only 
60% when it includes human errors and mechanical hazards (Taylor, 2007b).  
 
HAZOP is rather effective in removing process engineering related faults, but the 
problem is that HAZOP is done at a later stage, when all the process design is quite 
ready. One of the expectations is that HAZOP would not point out any need for 
process design related changes because the costs related to these changes made at a 
late stage are expensive. Therefore HAZOP does not support the process designer 
during the design work but acts as a final check. From the mechanical engineering 
point of view, HAZOP is done too early at the stage where detailed design has not 
been done or finished.  This shows that HAZOP lacks the capability to assist in the 
changes during the early stages.  
 
It has been identified that most accidents involve design element, and HAZOP has 
been used for decades as past accident based method for hazard identification to 
support the existing process safety methods. 
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5 Research Approach 
 
 
In this thesis, accident cases from an accident database are analyzed and the findings 
are used to create a method for improving the process safety in the design of chemical 
process plants. The research approach of the thesis work is based on the experience 
feedback cycle presented in Figure 5. The aim is to incorporate the accident 
information directly into design, where effective accident prevention can be done on 
the design and these changes are made during the early stages of design. 
 
5.1 Accident database selection 
 
As mentioned in Chapter 3.1, there are several accident databases available that can 
be used for the accident analysis. The Failure Knowledge Database (FKD, 2011) was 
selected for the study to minimize the problems related to insufficient and inaccurate 
data as pointed out by Kletz (2009). This accident database contains a total of 549 
accident cases. 364 are chemical industry related and 95% of the accidents happened 
in Japan from the years 1964 till 2003 The database is managed by experienced 
academia in Japan under the close monitoring of the Japan & Science Technology 
(JST) Agency. The accident reports are carefully reviewed by a nominated committee 
and they have compiled extensive information on the accidents. The availability of 
quite detailed technical and engineering information enables the analyses of accident 
contributors to be made. The basic structure and case expression of the database are 
discussed by Hatamura et al. (2003). 
 
5.2 Retrieval and analysis of accident data 
 
Accident information on 364 cases was retrieved and transformed into MS Excel 
format for frequency analysis aimed at identifying the following: 
a) the overall accident contributor categories such as technical, design, human 
and organizational (Paper I),  
b) the equipment types that are frequently involved in accidents (Paper II),  
c) the main contributors that trigger the accidents as well as the sub contributors 
that co-exist (Papers I and II),  
d) design errors and their origin during design activities (Papers III and IV),  
e) corrective actions taken to prevent similar accidents (Paper VI). 
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In Papers I and IV, all the 364 accident cases were used in the analyses. Papers II - IV 
discussed in detail the six major equipment types involving 284 accident cases.  
 
5.3 Dissemination of accident information into design process 
 
The approaches to utilize and disseminate accident information to design can be 
grouped into three categories: heuristic, case-based and statistical approaches (Figure 
6). Heuristic approach is experience based trial and error technique. Heuristic 
approaches include design checklists, standards and good engineering practice utilized 
by practicing engineers.  
 
Case-based reasoning (CBR) is a method of reusing information by retrieving the 
most similar cases and adapting them for solving the current problem. CBR has been 
utilized by Heikkilä et al. (1998) for evaluating the inherent safety level of process 
configuration. This was done by using a database comprising good and bad cases; i.e. 
design recommendations and accident cases. Hatakka and Reniers (2009) developed 
and used a CBR tool for accident databases for marine safety. 
 
In this work, the statistical approach was used to discover the most common 
contributors of accidents and their relationship. The analyses included frequencies of 
accident contributors from different points of views such as  
a) frequent accident contributors,  
b) frequent main-contributors,  
c) specific contributors  
d) contributors which often act as main contributors (SMC),  
e) contributors in the high risk cluster.  
 
The potential accident mechanism was identified through the interconnection of 
contributors. Based on usual design tasks and decisions, the time of occurrence of 
design and operation errors in the typical design project stages were identified. The 
findings were used for creating a design oriented safety method to support hazard 
identification activities during the design. The method aims to present the accident 
information based on a higher level of knowledge hierarchy (i.e. understanding as 
shown in Figure 4). 
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Figure 6: Integration of approaches for learning from accidents into design. 
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6 Statistical Analysis of Accidents 
 
 
Statistical analysis of accidents is an active research agenda in the CPI (Prem et al., 
2010; He et al., 2011; Lisbona et al., 2012).  Accidents are caused by organizational, 
human and technical faults (Sales et al., 2007; Jacobson et al., 2010) and a majority of 
the research focused on organizational and human failures. Detailed statistical studies 
on technical contributors to accidents are scarce. Thus, this study relies on the 364 
CPI-related accident cases available in the FKD database which are based on the 
analysis of technical contributors (Paper I).  
 
6.1 Accident contributors 
 
In Paper I, 364 accident cases were studied based on 15 categories of accident 
contributors. These included categories such as human & organizational faults (in 
operation), external factors and 13 sub-categories of technical faults. The technical 
category includes design and operator-technical interface related faults. Table 2 lists 
the descriptions of the accident contributors. 806 accident contributors based on 
multiple causes of accidents were identified and, the average was 2.2 contributors per 
accident. Figure 7 presents the distribution of the 806 accident contributors in this 
study. 
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Table 2: The classification of accident contributors  
Contributors Description  
Human & 
organizational faults 
in operation (a) 
Operation related human error and organizational failures. Design and 
operator-technical interface related human errors are classified into technical 
contributors. 
Contamination* (b) Traceable amount of unwanted chemicals such as impurities, recycle 
accumulation, residues, by-products formation, moisture etc.  
Flow related* (c) Contributors related to fluid flow and transfer such as velocity, viscosity, 
liquid hammer, reverse flow, leakages etc.  
Heat transfer* (d) Cooling, heating and their effects to physical changes in equipment and 
process conditions. 
Reaction* (e) Chemical reaction related contributors: unfinished, runaway and unwanted 
chemical reactions due to chemical reactivity and incompatibilities. 
Fabrication, 
construction and 
installation* (f) 
Faults in design specification, fabrication and installation concerning work 
planning, quality of work, welding, support arrangements, reconditioning and 
reusing items.  
Layout* (g) Plant layout, physical arrangement, positioning, equipment accessibility, 
visual obstacles, signage and color-coding etc.  
Corrosion* (h) Excessive corrosion attacked due to wrong design specification, construction, 
equipment and piping aging, lack of protection and water proofing etc. 
Construction 
material* (i) 
Inappropriate physical, mechanical and chemical specification of construction 
material for equipment, piping and components. 
Static electricity* (j) Electric charges generation, accumulation and discharge due to wrong 
material selection, isolation, lack of earthting and protection when handling 
process fluids, particulates, dust and powders.  
Mechanical failure* 
(k) 
Structural and wall failures due to crack, fatigue, rotation, moving 
object/parts, stress, wear and tear, etc. 
Utilities related* (l) Inappropriate design, decision and selection of utility systems and their 
equipment, availability of utilities as well as back-up system for emergency. 
Vibration* (m) Vibration resulting from fluids flow, pumping, poor installation, support etc. 
Erosion* (n) Result of fluid movement and flow pattern, gas/liquid phases, particulates, 
velocity, bubble ruptured and internal equipment layout etc. 
External factor (o) Physical and natural events such as bad weather, earthquake, floods, tsunami, 
lightning, land slides, and some random effects. 
Note: * classified as technical contributors 
 
 
19% of accident contributors were classified as ‘purely’ human and organizational 
failures in the plant operation stage (without design or operator-technical interface 
faults). Similar results were reported by Drogaris (1993), who found 18% of accident 
causes were operation related human & organizational faults. Meanwhile, 79% of 
causes were classified as technical which included design, analysis and also operator-
technical interface errors. In this category, the most common accident contributors 
were process contamination (11%), flow related faults (11%), heat transfer (10%), and 
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reactions (9%). In addition, approximately 2% of the accidents were caused by 
external factors e.g. weather, earthquake and random events. Causes of these 
contributors are further elaborated in Appendix 1 of Paper I. 
 
6.2 Operator-technical interface induced causes 
 
Paper I reviewed on the contribution of the operator-technical interface faults to 
accidents which was significant as it was 11% of the contributors (Refer Table 2 in 
Paper I). The operator-technical interface errors were not strictly design errors but 
they caused operators to make mistakes which led to accidents. Typical examples of 
these technical interface induced human failures include problems caused by wrong 
equipment or component labeling or positioning, confusing control panel display, and 
poor visibility or accessibility. 
 
The most critical category in interface errors was the flow related accident 
contributors (33% of flow related accident contributors). The value corresponded to 
1/3 of the interface-induced causes. The other frequent interface-affected contributors 
were contamination and heat transfer. These three contributors made up 2/3 of all the 
interface-related causes. Utility-related contributors were also greatly affected by 
interface problems (26%) but their frequency was small. Typical examples of 
technical interface induced human failures included wrong equipment or component 
labeling or positioning, confusing control panel display, poor visibility and 
accessibility caused problems. 
 
6.3 Main and sub contributors of accidents  
 
In Paper I, an analysis of the main and sub contributors of accidents and their 
interdependency was carried out. The main-contributor was considered to be the main 
factor that immediately initiated or triggered the accident. In some cases, the main 
contributor had solely initiated or triggered the accident. The sub-contributors also 
were significant in causing the accidents; however their roles were minor and 
considered as supporting factor only. If the main contributor were to be removed, the 
accidents would not happen at all or would have had a lower probability of 
happening.  
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Table 3 presents the frequencies of the contributors and the main contributors to 
accidents. The main contributors to accidents are 83% technical, 16% human and 
organizational and 1% external factors. To compare, technical aspects were 79% as 
contributors but even more (83%) as main contributor. The most common main 
contributors to accidents are human and organizational aspects (16%), followed by 
process contamination (14%), flow related aspects (13%), heat transfer (12%), layout 
(10%) and fabrication / construction / installation (10%).  
 
6.4 Importance study on accident contributors 
 
The importance of the analysis of accident contributors in accident prevention was 
carried out based on their share as main contributors (SMC) and being part of the four 
quadrants analysis in Paper I. The SMC of an accident contributor means how often it 
is identified as the main contributor compared to its presence in general as an accident 
contributor. For example, layout is the main contributor with 38 times of occurrences 
meanwhile as an overall contributor with 48 times. Therefore, the SMC for layout is 
calculated by 38/48 = 79%. The SMC represents the potential of an accident 
contributor to be the main contributor to an accident.  
 
In Table 3, the highest SMCs among all the contributors are: layout (79%), unsuitable 
construction material (67%) and errors in fabrication, construction and installation 
(65%). The average value of SMCs is 45%, which can be used as a benchmark for 
comparison purposes.  
 
Since SMC does not represent absolute frequency, a four-quadrant analysis was made 
for the contributors based on the SMC and frequency to estimate the importance of 
the accident contributors. In the four-quadrant analysis, the risky contributors are: 
contributors that tend to be frequent contributors to accidents and have a high SMC. 
As seen from Figure 8, the figure is divided into four-quadrants according to SMC 
values and frequency of occurrence. The analysis shows that the accident contributors 
could be grouped into 3 main clusters. However reaction (e) and human & 
organizational (a) do not fit into any of the clusters. The clusters are summarized in 
Table 4.  
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Table 3: Frequency and percentage according to main contributors (SMC) 
Contributing Factors 
Frequency 
SMC 
As contributor As main contributor 
Layout (g) 48 6% 38 10% 79% 
Construction material  (i) 43 5% 29 8% 67% 
Fabrication, construction & installation (f) 54 7% 35 10% 65% 
Corrosion (h) 45 6% 25 7% 56% 
Contamination (b) 92 11% 50 14% 54% 
Flow related (c) 91 11% 48 13% 53% 
Heat transfer (d) 82 10% 43 12% 52% 
Reaction (e) 75 9% 29 8% 39% 
Human & organizational (a) 156 19% 60 16% 38% 
External factor (o) 13 2% 3 1% 23% 
Utilities related (l) 19 2% 3 1% 16% 
Static electricity (j) 37 5% 1 0.3% 3% 
Mechanical failure (k) 31 4% 0 0% 0% 
Vibration (m) 12 1% 0 0% 0% 
Erosion (n) 8 1% 0 0% 0% 
TOTAL 806 100% 364 100% average: 45% 
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Figure 8: Percentile of main contributor (SMC) vs. frequency as accident contributors 
(for notation see Table 3) 
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Table 4: Clusters of main contributors and frequency as a main contributor 
Cluster 1 % Cluster 2 % Cluster 3 % Outside clusters % 
Contamination (b) 14 Layout (g) 10 Utility related (l) 0.8 Hum & org. (a) 16 
Flow related (c) 13 Fab./const/inst (f) 10 External factor (o) 0.8 Reaction (e) 8 
Heat transfer (d) 12 Const. material (i)  8 Static electricity (j) 0.2   
  Corrosion (h) 7     
Total 39 Total  35 Total 2 Total 24 
 
Referring to Figure 8 and Table 4, cluster 1 (b-contamination, c-flow related, and d-
heat transfer) has the highest frequency of occurrence and a high SMC, and therefore, 
is the most likely factor for causing accidents in the CPI.  
 
The second cluster consists of faults in the layout, construction material, fabrication-
construction-installation, and corrosion. This cluster is higher in SMC but is less 
frequent compared to the ones in cluster 1. The third cluster is made-up of less 
common and low SMCs contributors. Contributors outside the clusters (human & 
organizational and reaction) have lower than the average SMCs but their frequency is 
high. 
 
Since a contributor with a high SMC has a higher probability of causing accidents and  
not only contributing as a sub-factor, thus accident prevention should focus on the 
high SMC contributors as they have a high frequency. Therefore, the importance 
based on ranking as the most likely contributors to accidents are: cluster 1 comprising 
process contamination, flow related & heat transfer, followed by cluster 2 which 
contains layout, fabrication/construction/ installation, construction material & 
corrosion, and outside cluster; human & organizational and reaction. 
 
6.5 Interconnection of accident contributors 
 
Some main accidents and sub-contributors have a strong relation to one another. 
Therefore, a correlation study was carried out by using interconnection matrix (Refer 
Table 5 in Paper I). The correlation study investigates the probability of accident 
contributor act together to cause an accident. The finding helps for early accident 
scenario prediction. The main interconnections of accident contributors are illustrated 
in Figure 9. A thick line represents the strongest correlation between two accident 
contributors, while a thin line shows a strong correlation and a dotted line indicates a 
medium correlation. 
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Three functional groups of accident contributors identified from Figure 9 are as 
follows: 
 Human and organizational failures group. This is specifically related to flow 
oriented problems (such as transfer and handling of chemicals), heat transfer 
activities, layout issues, static electricity control and construction materials.  
 Reaction, heat transfer, contamination oriented group. Process contamination is 
created or caused by unwanted chemical reactions, which could be prevented by 
identifying possible routes and sources of the contaminants (i.e. layout and flow 
related factors) and by reducing operating errors (i.e. the human aspects).  Heat 
transfer and reaction are very closely related and their effects on the process safety 
should be considered mutually.  
 Mechanical & material contributors group. Mechanical faults are affected by 
fabrication/construction/installation and by corrosion which are affected by 
construction materials.  
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Figure 9: Diagram of Interconnection between accident contributors with functional 
groups (the thicker the line the stronger the interconnection). The arrows show the 
direction from sub to main contributor. 
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7 Process Equipment Accidents 
 
 
The focus of this chapter (Refer Paper II) is to identify the reasons behind process 
equipment failures. Several studies on equipment failures have been carried out in the 
CPI. However, equipment failures were considered as only sub-topics in the accident 
cause analysis (Duguid, 2001; Gunasekera and Alwis, 2008; He at el., 2011; Hou and 
Zhang, 2009; Prem at el., 2010). Therefore, a study to identify the reasons for 
equipment based accidents was done and presented in Paper II.  
 
Identification of equipment based accidents was done by analyzing 364 CPI-related 
accident equipment type cases in the FKD database. The results for the most 
frequently involved type of equipment are shown in Figure 10. The most common 
ones are piping (25%), reactor (14%) and storage tank (14%). The results are 
comparable with previous studies (Refer Table 1 in Paper II).  
 
7.1 The contributors to process equipment accidents 
 
The six most commonly accident causing equipment types were selected for a more 
detailed analysis. The findings showed that 78% of accidents involving 284 accident 
cases and 623 accident contributors were due to multiple causes of accidents. The 
accident categories used were the same as the ones used in Table 2.). Table 5 presents 
the percentiles of the contributors for six types of equipment.  
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Figure 10: Proportions of accidents caused by specific equipment  
 
Table 5: Number and percentage of contributors in equipment related accidents 
Accident contributor Piping System 
Storage 
Tank Reactor 
Heat Transfer 
Eq. 
Process 
Vessel 
Separation 
Eq. Total 
Human/organizational (a) 41 (18%) 36 (33%) 12 (16%) 12 (16%) 12 (17%) 9 (15%) 122 (20%) 
Contamination* (b) 17 (7%) 6 (5%) 12 (16%) 11 (15%) 14 (19%) 15 (25%) 75 (12%) 
Heat transfer* (c) 17 (7%) 10 (9%) 17 (23%) 11 (15%) 8 (11%) 9 (15%) 72 (12%) 
Flow related* (d) 23 (10%) 15 (14%) 6 (8%) 9 (12%) 10 (14%) 8 (13%) 71 (11%) 
Reaction* (e) 10 (4%) 3 (3%) 17 (23%) 2 (3%) 12 (17%) 9 (15%) 53 (9%) 
Layout* (f) 25 (11%) 6 (5%) 1 (1%) 4 (5%) 5 (7%) 3 (5%) 44 (7%) 
Fab. const. & inst.* (g) 30 (13%) 5 (5%) 2 (3%) 5 (7%) 1 (1%)   43 (7%) 
Corrosion* (h) 22 (9%) 4 (4%) 3 (4%) 8 (11%) 1 (1%)   38 (6%) 
Construction material* (i) 19 (8%) 4 (4%) 3 (4%) 8 (11%) 2 (3%) 1 (2%) 37 (6%) 
Static electricity* (j) 2 (1%) 6 (6%) 2 (2%) 3 (4%) 5 (7%) 3 (5%) 21 (3%) 
Mechanical failure* (k) 8 (3%) 4 (4%)     2 (3%) 1 (2%) 15 (2%) 
External factor (l) 4 (2%) 9 (8%)         13 (2%) 
Vibration* (m) 8 (3%)     1 (1%)     9 (1%) 
Erosion* (n) 6 (3%)           6 (1%) 
Utility related* (o) 2 (1%)         2 (%) 4 (1%) 
Total contributors 234 (37%) 108 (17%) 75 (12%) 74 (12%) 72 (12%) 60 (10%) 623 
Contributors per accident 2.5 2.2 1.4 2.5 2.1 2.4 2.2 
Note: *) classified as technical contributors 
 
In Table 5, the operation related human & organizational causes are the largest 
percentile of contributors (20%). However, the main portion of 78% refers to 
technically oriented causes including design and operator interface errors. External 
causes such as earthquake, bad weather, lighting, etc. are 2%. An accident has 
typically 2.2 contributors. Piping has the largest number of contributors per accident 
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which is 2.5 and this is the same for heat transfer equipment whereas the reactor 
accidents have only 1.4 contributors. 
 
At the process equipment level, piping is the most common and risk prone part of the 
chemical process. The typical accident contributors are related to human and 
organization aspects (18%), fabrication/construction/installation (13%), layout (11%), 
and flow (10%) related causes. Piping accidents had more contributors which was 2.5 
per accident as compared to other equipment whose average was 2.2. 
 
Reactors were involved in 14% of the accidents. Majority (71%) of the reactor 
accidents involved batch or semi-batch reactor operations. The higher number of 
failures in batch reactors is expected due to the dynamic character of batch reactions, 
variable products, partly manual operations, the reactive materials handled and 
difficulties in design. The main reasons for accident are inadequate process analysis 
on heat transfer (23%), reaction problems (23%) and process contamination (16%). 
 
Storage tanks were responsible for the third highest number of accidents (14%) 
mainly due to organizational and human failures (33% of contributors), flow related 
(14%), heat transfer (9%), and external factors (8%). Other major issues were related 
to poor planning and lack of analysis e.g. in chemical transfer and tank cleaning or 
maintenance. 
 
Process vessels represent 10% of accidents in the CPI. Typical issues of process 
vessel operations are their complex interactions with other equipment through piping. 
Therefore contamination was the most common (19%) accident contributor and 
followed by unwanted chemical reaction in the vessel (17%) and flow related (14%) 
causes. The contribution of organizational & human causes to process vessel failures 
was also significant (17%). 
 
Approximately 7-8% of accidents in the CPI were related to heat transfer and 
separation equipment failures. The most common accident contributors to heat 
transfer equipment failure were human and organizational (16%), process 
contamination (15%) and heat transfer (15%) related causes.  
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The majority of the separation equipment accidents (80%) involved distillation 
operations. Common accident contributors were process contamination (25%), heat 
transfer (15%), human & organizational (15%), reaction (15%), and flow related 
(13%) aspects. A more detailed analysis of the accident contributors is presented in 
Appendix 1 of Paper II. 
 
7.2 Accident main contributors 
 
The analysis on main contributors (MC) and shares of main contributors (SMC) for 
the various equipment types was also carried out by using similar analysis approach 
as in Chapter 6. The results are summarized in Table 6. The analysis shows that the 
most frequent main contributors in equipment accidents were operation stage related 
human & organizational issues (16 %), contamination (14 %), flow related aspects 
(13%), heat transfer (12%) and layout (11%).  
Table 6: Main contributors to accidents and their percentiles 
Accident contributors 
Piping 
system 
Storage   
tank Reactor 
Heat transfer 
eq. 
Process 
vessel 
Separation 
eq. Overall 
MC SMC, % 
M
C 
SMC, 
% 
M
C 
SMC, 
% 
M
C 
SMC, 
% 
M
C 
SMC, 
% 
M
C 
SMC, 
% MC 
SMC, 
% 
Layout (f) 19 76 4 67     3 75 3 60 2 67 31 70 
Fab. const & inst. (g) 17 57 5 100 1 50 3 60 1 100     27 63 
Material const. (i) 13 68 4 100     2 25 1 50 1 100 21 57 
Corrosion (h) 9 41 3 75 2 67 6 75 1 100     21 55 
Flow related (d) 9 39 12 80 5 83 3 33 5 50 3 38 37 52 
Contamination (b) 5 29 1 17 9 75 4 36 13 93 7 47 39 52 
Utilities related (o) 1 50                 1 50 2 50 
Heat transfer (c) 7 41 4 40 12 71 4 36 4 50 3 33 34 47 
Reaction (e)     1 33 16 94     2 17 4 44 23 43 
Human & org (a) 12 29 13 36 7 7 5 42 5 40 4 44 46 38 
External factor (l)     2 22                 2 15 
Static electricity (j)     1 17                 1 5 
Erosion (n)                         0   
Mechanical failure (k)                         0   
Vibration (m)                         0   
Total/SMC average 92 39 50 46 52 69 30 41 35 49 25 42 284 46 
Notation: MC – count as main contributor; SMC – share as main contributor in percentage, % 
 
The contributors with the largest and most SMCs were poor layout (70%) and 
fabrication/ construction/ installation (63%) as compared to the average SMC value of 
all contributors which was 46%. A large SMC shows the capability of the contributor 
to act as a main contributor to an accident. 
 
Reactor (69%), has the highest SMC average followed by process vessel (49%) and 
storage tank (46%). Since reactor accidents had only 1.4 contributors per accident 
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(Table 5), a single contributor  was enough to cause an accident for reactors in 56% of 
the cases, when there was an  average 2.2 contributors for all types of equipment. This 
means that reactors as equipment are quite sensitive to reaction, heat transfer, 
contamination and flow related accident contributors. Only one fault in the equipment 
can cause an accident without the presence of other contributors. 
 
7.3 Interconnection analysis 
 
Based on the interconnection technique described in Chapter 6.5, an interconnection 
study of main and sub contributors was done for the process equipment types in Paper 
II. Table 7 shows the main interconnections matrix based on Table 5 of Paper II. The 
interconnections were divided into three groups: human & organizational, reaction & 
heat transfer, and mechanical & material as described in Figure 9. The shares of the 
interconnection groups are presented graphically in Figure 11.  
Table 7: The interconnections between accident main and sub-contributors to 
accidents for certain equipment types 
 
Equipment 
Interconnection level 
Largest Medium 
Piping 
 Layout to: Human & org., 9%   Flow related to: Human & org., 7%   
 Layout to: Contamination, 8%; flow related, 5% 
 Construction material to: Corrosion, 8% 
 Fab. cont & inst. to: Vibration, 7%; mechanical failure, 5%  
Storage 
tank 
 Flow related to: Human & org., 20%  Human & org. to: Heat transfer, 9% 
 Heat transfer to: Human & org., 9% 
 Const. material to: Static electricity, 9%; human & org., 9% 
 Fab. const & inst. to: External factor, 9% 
 Layout: Human & org, 9% 
Reactor 
 Reaction to: Heat transfer, 10% - 
Process 
vessel 
 Contamination to: Reaction, 14%  Contamination to: Human & org, 9% 
 Heat transfer to: Reaction, 9% 
Heat 
transfer eq. 
 Corrosion to: Contamination, 9%; 
construction material, 10% 
 Human & org. to: Flow related, 10% 
- 
Separation 
equipment 
 Contamination to: Human & org, 12% 
 Reaction to: Heat transfer, 12% 
- 
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Figure 11: The shares of contributor interconnection groups for equipment. 
It was found that different equipment types have characteristic interconnections. 
Piping accidents had interconnections that were almost equally divided between the 
three groups of interconnections. Storage tanks had mainly human & organizational 
interconnections. Reactors and separation equipment were reaction & heat transfer 
group dominated. Heat transfer equipment had its main interconnections in 
mechanical and material group, meanwhile, process vessels were equally divided 
between human & organizational and reaction & heat transfer groups.  
 
7.4 Specific contributors 
 
Equipment types have specific contributors of which they are especially vulnerable 
and these contributors are more frequent than average in the accidents of particular 
equipment. The specific accident contributor frequency values in Table 5 were 
divided by the average frequencies for each equipment type. The results in Table 8 
show erosion is relatively 2.7 times more frequent as an accident cause in piping 
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accidents: 3% in equipment accidents as compared on average 1% (see Table 5). On 
the other hand, it should be noted that some of the contributors have a low absolute 
frequency; e.g. erosion happened in only 3% of piping accidents. Relative frequency 
values in Table 8 show a technique to identify specific accident contributors which is 
not common in general safety analyses.  
 
Table 8: Comparison of frequency among the average accident contributors for 
certain equipment type (Paper II). 
Equipment Accident contributors Frequency as contributor, % 
Times more common than 
on average 
Piping system Erosion  
Vibration 
Fabrication, construction & installation 
Corrosion 
Layout 
3 
3 
13 
9 
11 
2.7 
2.4 
1.9 
1.5 
1.5 
Storage tank External factor 
Human & organizational 
Static electricity 
Mechanical failure 
8 
33 
6 
4 
4.0 
1.7 
1.7 
1.5 
Reactor Reaction oriented 
Heat transfer 
23 
23 
2.7 
2.0 
Heat transfer 
equipment 
Construction material 
Corrosion 
11 
11 
1.8 
1.8 
Process vessel Static electricity 
Reaction oriented 
Contamination 
7 
17 
19 
2.1 
2.0 
1.6 
Separation 
equipment 
Utility 
Contamination 
Reaction oriented 
3 
25 
15 
5.0 
2.1 
1.8 
 
 
7.5 Cluster analysis 
 
A four-quadrant analysis was carried out in Paper II for each process equipment type 
to identify the high risk contributors. The approach is described in Chapter 6.4. 
Quadrant 1 presents the most risky contributors with high frequency and SMC (Refer 
Figure 2 of Paper II). Table 9 summarizes these risky contributors for accident 
contributor identification on specific equipment type.  
 
The characteristics of equipment type can be compared by using the same method as 
mentioned in Chapter 6.4. Figure 12 presents the four-quadrant analysis for the 
average values of SMC and frequency for the equipment type. As seen from the 
Figure 12, the reactor has a very high SMC, therefore the reactor can clearly be 
considered as the most risky equipment type as most of the cases involved a single 
contributor that has the potential of causing an accident without sub contributors. 
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Storage tanks have the average SMC and frequency of the most risky quadrant. Piping 
has a very high accident frequency but a low SMC, implying that there are a large 
number of contributors present. Table 6 of Paper II summarizes the main points of the 
findings in a concise checklist form to support accident contributor identification. 
 
Table 9:  Contributors of high risk of accident (Cluster 1) 
Equipment  Cluster 1 
Reactor Reaction, heat transfer, and contamination 
Storage tank Flow related 
Heat transfer eq. Corrosion and human & organizational 
Process vessel Contamination, flow related and heat transfer 
Separation eq. Human & organizational, contamination and reaction 
Piping system Layout, fab. const & installation, construction material, corrosion, flow related, and heat transfer  
 
 
 
Piping
system
Storage tank
Reactor
Heat
transfer
eq.
Pressure 
vessel
Separation
eq.
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
0% 10% 20% 30% 40%
SM
C
Frequency
average: 46%
average: 16.7%
 
Figure 12: Average SMC and accident frequency for equipment type. 
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8 Design Errors in the Chemical Process 
Industry 
 
 
Research on the design errors has been largely neglected (Bourrier, 2005; Busby, 
1998). Only a few statistical data and lessons learnt have been presented (Hale et al., 
2007b; Taylor, 2007b). As a result, there is not much design error information 
available to be used for the detection and elimination of accidents during process 
development and design. Therefore, in Paper III, an analysis of the design errors was 
carried out to identify the contribution of design errors to accidents. The timing of the 
design errors during design project was also studied. 
 
8.1 The contribution of design errors to accidents 
 
284 accident cases in FKD database related to piping, reactors, storage tanks, process 
vessels, heat transfer and separation equipment were reanalyzed to determine the 
contribution of design related errors to process accidents. In this study the design 
error definition by Taylor (1975) is used based on “a design error is deemed to have 
occurred, if the design or operating procedures are changed after an incident has 
occurred”.  
 
Therefore, a design error was committed if the accident report recommended changes 
in the process or its designed operating procedures. Both technical and procedural 
errors were included in this study but corrective actions due to human and 
organizational failures were not included. The errors were divided into 11 categories 
as described in Table 10. It should be noted that the design errors and the corrective 
actions proposed in accident reports are not equivalent. The reports tend to propose 
procedural changes for costing reasons even though there were technical design errors 
present (Refer Chapter 11). 
 
The study found that approximately 79% (224 out of 284) of accident cases were 
involved in at least one design error. Majority of these cases (72%) had multiple 
design errors resulting in 526 errors in total, with an average of 2.35 design errors per 
accident. 59% of the design errors involved changes in equipment or process such as 
change in layout, replacement of construction material, re-sizing etc. The remaining 
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41% were classified as non-hardware related changes including equipment setting, 
automation, design documentation etc. The results of the analysis are presented in 
Table 11. 
 
The result on the contribution of design errors on accidents was 79% and this is 
slightly higher compared to previous studies which were 70% (Drogaris, 1993; HSE, 
2003). The difference can be explained by a more detailed analysis where 2.35 design 
errors per case was discovered as compared to Drogaris’ 1.4 and HSE’s study with 1.3 
design errors per case. 
 
Table 10: Classification of design errors 
Design error Description 
Process condition Inappropriate process condition selection due to lack of knowledge/data, 
inadequate analysis, wrong assumption/interpretation of process data, 
environmental/ surrounding input overlook/ignored etc. 
Reactivity/ 
incompatibility 
Lack of analysis of chemical reactivity and incompatibility hazard at normal 
and abnormal process conditions as well as an ignorance of possible process 
contamination, unintended chemical mix-up and process/environmental 
changes. 
Unsuitable 
equipment/ part 
Unsuitable equipment, components or parts selection that creates operational 
problems (e.g. wrong application, uneven flow or blockage) or increase the 
risk of accidents. 
Material of 
construction 
Wrong specification of material construction selection in term of physical, 
mechanical, chemical resistance and environmental/ surrounding 
characteristics. 
Sizing Inappropriate sizing (oversize or undersize) of process equipment and its 
piping system that affect their function and reliability during normal and 
abnormal process conditions (e.g. flow related or two-phase phenomena) 
Utility set-up Wrong utility selection and its realization especially related to maximum 
heating/cooling capacity, incompatible heat transfer medium and its 
flow/handling/control mechanism. 
Protection Inadequate design for safety due to lack of analysis and limited process 
information especially related to thermal safety, relief types and sizing as well 
as overall mitigation system. 
Layout Errors on plant layout, physical arrangement, positioning, equipment 
accessibility, visual obstacles, operator/technical interface and color-coding 
etc. 
Automation/ 
instrumentation 
Inadequate automation and instrumentation especially during abnormal process 
conditions for proactive process deviation/hazard detection, response and 
mitigation. 
Operating manual Wrong work procedures that jeopardize the safe operation of process 
equipment such as wrong sequence of work, wrong/unclear direction/ 
instruction, and wrong hand tool or material used. 
Fabrication/ 
construction/ 
installation 
Design oriented problems related to welding defect, thermal expansion 
phenomena, stress, and miss-match of process equipment with their 
connectivity. Some of major equipment has a long delivery time that needs to 
be ordered early. In some cases, their detailed design is not fit to as built. 
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Table 11: Distribution of design and operational errors per equipment type 
Design errors Piping system Reactor 
Process 
vessel 
Storage 
tank 
Separation 
eq. 
Heat 
transfer eq. Total % 
Layout 44 9 12 14 3 7 89 17 
Reactivity/incompatibility 4 17 29 4 22 7 83 16 
Process condition 10 16 15 3 25 13 82 16 
Protection 9 12 19 17 8 7 72 14 
Construction material 37 5 3 11 1 3 60 11 
Utility set-up 1 13 4 7 11 4 40 8 
Unsuitable equipment/part 3 7 10 13 3 3 39 7 
Fab/const/installation 11 2 4 5  7 29 6 
Automation/instrumentation  11   3 1 15 3 
Sizing  5 3  1 1 10 2 
Operating manual 1 3  3   7 1 
Total 120 100 99 77 77 53 526 100 
 
 
8.2 Most common types of design errors 
 
Table 11 summarizes the contribution of various types of design errors to process 
equipment accidents. The most common design errors are associated with poor 
process layout (17% of design errors), followed by inadequate analysis of chemical 
reactivity & incompatibility (16%), incorrect process conditions selected (16%), and 
lack of protection (14%).  
 
The ranking variation is dependent on the type of equipment. In piping systems, the 
most common design errors are related to poor layout (44 cases) and unsuitable 
construction materials (37 cases). Typical errors in reactor design are inadequate 
safety analysis on chemical reactivity & incompatibility (17 cases) and process 
conditions selection (16 cases). In many cases, the design errors are inter-correlated 
with chemical reactivity, stability, incompatibilities, and process deviations.  
 
Design errors of separation equipment and process vessels are very similar to reactors 
i.e. chemical reactivity & incompatibility, process conditions and protection system. 
In storage tank designs, the usual errors are lack of protection (17 cases) and poor 
layout (14 cases). Meanwhile, the most significant design errors associated with heat 
transfer equipment are inappropriate process condition (13 cases).  
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The root causes of the design errors are presented in Appendix 1 of Paper III. On 
average, the most common root causes of design errors are process contamination, 
(5.1%), physical arrangement (4.0%) and reactions with contaminants (3.8%) (Refer 
to Table 4 in Paper III). 
 
8.3  Timing of design errors 
 
In Paper III, the design errors were linked with design project stages by determining 
their time of occurrence in a typical design project based on the usual schedule of 
plant design activities (Table 1 in Chapter 4). The design decisions give the timing for 
the corresponding design errors. Since design involves both preliminary and final 
decisions, the time of design error committed was selected to correspond to the time 
of final design decision (Table 12). The frequency of the design errors in each stage 
identified was based on Tables 11 and 12. The number of design errors during each 
plant design stage is presented in Figure 13 and in more detail for each error category 
in Figure 3 of Paper III. The details of errors in each stage are presented in Appendix 
2 of Paper III.  
 
 
Table 12: Origin of  design errors based on final design decisions. 
 Design errors Piping system Reactor Process vessel Storage tank Separation eq. Heat transfer eq. 
 Process condition P R&D P P P P 
 Reactivity/incompatibility P R&D P P P P 
 Unsuitable equipment/part D P/D P/D P/D P/D P/D 
 Construction material B B B B B B 
 Sizing B B B B B B 
 Utility set-up B B B B B B 
 Protection B B B B B B 
 Automation/instrumentation B B B B B B 
 Layout D B B B B B 
 Operating manual D D D D D D 
 Fab/const/installation C&S C&S C&S C&S C&S C&S 
Note: R&D - Research and Development; P - Preliminary Engineering; B - Basic Engineering; D - Detailed Engineering; C&S - 
Construction & Start-Up. 
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Figure 13:  Number and share of the design errors throughout plant lifecycle.  
(Total of design errors = 526). 
 
According to Figure 13, the majority (59%) of the design errors occurred in the 
process design related phases: basic engineering (32%), preliminary engineering 
(22%) and research and development (5%). Errors in detailed engineering were also 
significant (32%). However, design errors during construction & start-up (5%) and in 
later plant modifications (4%) were low. 
 
Design errors originating from research and development (R&D) were low but high at 
the preliminary engineering and highest at the basic and detailed engineering phases. 
The reason for this is related to the number of design decisions made at each stage. In 
R&D, few but large conceptual decisions are made on process route and operating 
conditions. In R&D and preliminary design, almost all of the design errors are related 
to process condition and reactivity & incompatibility (Refer Figure 3 of Paper III). In 
the later phases, the number of decision parameter categories increased when more 
design decisions were made at the equipment level with reference to dimensioning, 
positioning and processing conditions; which had created a large number of design 
errors. 
 
8.4 Points to look for in a safer design 
 
Figure 3 in Paper III provides the details on the frequency and timing of design errors. 
These values represent the importance of each design error category in the design 
stages. Table 13 summarizes the most frequent design error types, which should be 
the focus at each design stage. The most frequent design error categories have been 
marked with five asterisks. The most error prone design aspects are; selection of 
process conditions and consideration of reactivity & incompatibility issues in 
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preliminary engineering, and the selection of layout and equipment protection in 
detailed engineering.  
 
Proper consideration should be given to fundamental decisions at the early stages of 
plant design due to their effect at the later stages. Errors made such as in reaction 
system specification create more errors at the basic engineering stage and even more 
in the detailed design. If proper process analysis is carried out at the early phase of 
process development and design, the combinatorial explosion of effects of erroneous 
process data can be eliminated at the later design stages.  
 
 
Table 13: Priority list for design error elimination 
Error category Conceptual & preliminary design 
Basic 
engineering 
Detailed 
engineering 
Construction & 
start-up 
Layout  ** ****  
Process conditions *****    
Reactivity & incompatibility *****    
Protection  * ***  
Construction material  ***   
Utility set-up  **   
Fab/const/installation    * 
Unsuitable equipment/part   *  
***** = high priority;   * = low priority 
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9 Timing and Origin of Equipment Design 
and Operation Errors  
 
 
Although the importance of early safety and design evaluation is known, the lifecycle 
aspect of process safety has not been given much attention by researchers. Therefore, 
there is very limited process safety knowledge from lifecycle perspective available in 
the literature. Thus, the aim of Paper IV is to conduct out deeper analysis on the 
lifecycle aspects of process safety and design.  
 
9.1 Design and operational errors of process equipment 
 
To study the design and operation errors in process lifecycle, design errors and their 
origins were studied and presented in Paper III. The paper was extended to include 
operational and plant modification faults in the operation phase. Table 14 shows the 
frequencies of accidents causing errors based on the six main types of equipment. In 
total, 661 errors were found in the 284 accident cases with an average of 2.3 accident 
contributors per accident.  
 
Table 14: Distribution of design, operational and external causes to process 
equipment accidents (661 contributors in 284 accidents) 
Accident contributors 
Piping 
system 
Storage 
tank Reactor 
Process 
vessel 
Separation 
eq. 
Heat 
transfer eq. Total 
No. % No. % No. % No. % No. % No. % No. % 
Layout 44 27 14 11 9 8 12 11 3 3 7 11 89 13 
Organizational failure * 26 16 25 20 12 11 10 9 6 7 8 12 87 13 
Reactivity/incompatibility 4 2 4 3 17 15 29 26 22 26 7 11 83 13 
Process condition 10 6 3 2 16 14 15 14 25 29 13 20 82 12 
Protection 9 5 17 14 12 11 19 17 8 9 7 11 72 11 
Construction material  37 22 11 9 5 4 3 3 1 1 3 5 60 9 
Utility set-up 1 1 7 6 13 12 4 4 11 13 4 6 40 6 
Unsuitable equipment/part 3 2 13 11 7 6 10 9 3 3 3 5 39 6 
Human failure * 15 9 11 9   2 2 3 3 4 6 35 5 
Fab/const/installation 11 7 5 4 2 2 4 4   7 11 29 4 
Automation/instrument     11 10   3 3 1 2 15 2 
External factors * 4 2 9 7         13 2 
Sizing     5 4 3 3 1 1 1 2 10 2 
Operating manual 1 1 3 2 3 3       7 1 
Total / overall percentage 165 25 122 18 112 17 111 17 86 13 65 10 661 100 
*) in plant operation 
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80% of the errors are design oriented whereas 18% are organizational and human 
errors in the operation stages and 2% are external factors. The results correspond to 
Table 11 and the operation errors and external factors have also been included in the 
table. Organizational errors in operation stage represent 13% of all errors and rank 
second. Based on the statistics of equipment type accident, storage tank accidents are 
due to organizational errors. Human failures at the operation stage represent only 5% 
of the overall errors; however at specific equipment types, they are a burden for 
piping and storage tank operation (both 9% of accidents). External factors contribute 
about 2% of errors, which mainly affect storage tank safety problems caused by 
earthquakes. 
 
9.2 Design and operation errors of equipment in plant lifecycle 
 
The design and operational faults found for the equipment types in Table 14 were 
linked to their time of occurrence during the process design and operation lifecycle. 
To identify the timing of errors, a similar approach is used in Paper III which is 
described in chapter 8, inclusive of the operating and plant modification stage errors. 
The results are presented in Table 15.  
 
In Table 15 the average number of errors are divided quite evenly, approximately 
20% - 25% each, which are classified as R&D/preliminary, basic, detailed 
engineering and operation phases. However, separators, process vessels and reactors 
have the most number of accident leading faults at the early design phases (i.e. 
research & development; preliminary and basic engineering), while storage tanks, 
piping and heat transfer equipment have more faults at the later phases (i.e. from 
detailed engineering onwards).  
 
Each type of process equipment has specific fault characteristics. Storage tanks and 
piping system are prone to failures with poor operations. Process vessels and 
separation equipment resemble their fault profile whereby both are sensitive to poor 
decisions made at the conceptual design stage. Piping, reactors and heat transfer 
equipment are most sensitive to faults in basic engineering. Reactor design is also 
affected by the R&D stage data (chemical reactivity, thermal safety etc.) Storage 
tanks are sensitive to errors in detailed engineering. Heat transfer equipment has a 
quite even distribution of error sources at the design and operation stages.  
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Table 15: Time of origin of design and operational faults for process equipment 
 Design phases Piping system Storage tank Reactor 
Process 
vessel 
Separation 
eq. 
Heat   
transfer eq. Total 
Research & development *     26 23%       26 4% 
Preliminary engineering * 10 6% 8 7% 2 2% 42 38% 41 48% 13 20% 116 18% 
Basic engineering * 56 34% 15 12% 31 28% 31 28% 21 24% 16 25% 170 26% 
Detailed engineering 45 27% 50 41% 28 25% 21 19% 15 17% 13 20% 172 26% 
Construction & start-up 6 4% 7 6% 2 2% 5 5%  0% 6 9% 26 4% 
Operations – H&O failures 45 27% 39 32% 12 11% 12 11% 9 10% 12 18% 129 20% 
Plant modification 3 2% 3 2% 11 10%     5 8% 22 3% 
Total 165 100% 122 100% 112 100% 111 100% 86 100% 65 100% 661 100% 
* Share of process 
development & design 40% 19% 53% 66% 72% 45% 48% 
Note: H&O – human and organizational 
 
Preliminary design (including R&D) is the most important design step for separation 
equipment and process vessels. On other hand, basic engineering is the most critical 
part of the design for piping system while detailed engineering is important for 
storage tanks. For reactors and heat transfer equipment, all the design stages are 
equally important. In the operation stage, many errors are made during piping and 
storage tanks operations. Reactors are subject to many design errors in plant 
modification. Paper IV discusses in more detail the design and operation errors for the 
six main equipment types in the lifecycle stages. The detailed statistics are in 
Appendix 1 of Paper IV. 
 
9.3 Most frequent errors and their timings 
 
The most frequent design and operation errors involved in process equipment 
accidents were identified based on the accident data presented in Tables 14 and 15. 
The data were plotted to present the frequency of accident-causing faults in process 
lifecycle phases (Refer Figure 1 in Paper IV). This mapping is useful in identifying 
the critical accident contributors of equipment design and providing the typical timing 
of the design errors. The results are summarized in Table 16.  
 
Table 16 presents the most frequent design and operation errors for the process 
lifecycle stages. The number after the accident contributor presents the frequency 
showing how often the contributor was present in the accident data. The most frequent 
general contributors are listed for each stage as well as the same contributors that are 
present for most of the equipment types. 
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The R&D and pre-design in Table 16 show the most important contributors which are 
process contaminants and secondary reactions that had caused unexpected reactions 
and corrosion problems. These contributors are relevant for nearly all the types of 
equipment. Therefore, to prevent similar accident related to process contaminants and 
secondary reactions, it is important to check the reaction chemistry and the actual 
composition of the feedstock chemicals used during design.  
 
In the basic engineering, the main design errors are mechanical and chemical 
specifications of equipment as well as the physical arrangement of piping and 
equipment. Lack of knowledge on process chemistry and chemicals causes a 
significant amount of design errors in the basic engineering too, such as unsuitable 
materials for construction.  
 
In detailed engineering, the most common contributors are related to flammability i.e. 
inert gas blanketing and static electricity prevention. In construction and start-up, the 
quality of fabrication and prevention of mechanical stress in equipment and piping are 
important. In the operation phase, lack of physical checking, and lack of inspection & 
maintenance are the most critical faults causing a significant amount of equipment 
failures. In later modifications, there are various contributors to accidents especially 
regarding reactors. Details are provided in Appendix 1 of Paper IV.  
 
Information given in Table 16 can be used for supporting design by identifying the 
aspects commonly overlooked in design projects and current risk analyses. 
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Table 16: List of most frequent design and operation errors per lifecycle stage for 
chemical process equipment 
Equipment Piping system Storage tank Reactor 
 
Process R&D 
and  
Pre-design 
 
- Process contaminations, 6 
   
- Reaction with 
contaminants, 4 
- Process contaminations, 3 
- Uneven flow/dry 
condition, 3 
- Reactive heat transfer 
medium, 3 
 
 
 
 
Basic 
Engineering 
- Mechanical specification, 
13 
- Chemical specification, 11 
- Physical arrangement, 9 
- Sizing/ Thickness, 7 
- Shared piping, 4 
- Single valve, 3 
 
- Physical arrangement, 3 
- Friction/ impact, 3 
 - Flammable sealing/ 
cleaning agent, 3 
 
- Extreme heating/ cooling 
source, 4 
- Physical arrangement 4 
- Chemical resistance spec, 
3 
- Lack of detection by 
automation, 3 
 
 
Detailed 
Engineering 
- Physical arrangement, 9 
- Dead end, 8 
- Support arrangement, 5 
- U-shape, 5 
- Flow restriction, 3 
 
 
- Spark-generating parts, 9 
- No nitrogen blanket, 8 
- Static electricity, 7 
- Non-conductive part, 6 
 
- Setting error, 4 
- No nitrogen blanket, 4 
- Feeding mechanism, 4 
- Maintenance/repair 
(operating manual), 3 
Construction 
& start-up 
- Bolt tightening related, 2 
- Poor fabrication/ 
construction quality, 2 
 
 
- Stress concentration3 
 
- Welding defect, 2 
Operation - Contractor mgt/ control, 5 
- Lack of maintenance, 5  
- No double & physical 
check, 4 
- Work permit related, 3 
- Poor mgt system, 3 
- No problem-reporting 
system, 3 
 
 
- Poor planning, 5 
- Lack of maintenance, 5  
- Lack of analysis, 4 
- Misjudgment, 4 
- Not following procedure, 
4 
- No double & physical 
check, 4 
- Lack of analysis, 3 
- No double & physical 
check, 2 
 
Modification   Various, 11 
 
 
Note: The numbers show the frequency of the accident contributors 
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Table 16: cont… 
 
Process vessel Separation eq. Heat transfer eq. All 
 
- Reaction with 
contaminants, 6 
- Secondary reaction, 6 
- Process 
contaminations, 6 
- Hazardous material 
generated, 4 
- High temperature, 3 
- Waste handling, 3 
 
 
 
- Process contaminants, 
7 
- Reaction with 
contaminants, 7 
- Secondary reaction, 7 
 
- Process 
contaminations, 3 
 
- Process 
contaminants, 26 
- Reaction with 
contaminants, 17 
- Secondary reaction, 
13 
 
- Friction/impact, 3 
- Physical arrangement, 
3 
 
- Incompatible heat 
transfer medium, 3 
- Utility set-up: various 
- Incompatible heat 
transfer medium, 3 
- Single valve, 2 
- Mechanical & 
chemical spec., 27 
- Physical 
arrangement, 19 
- Sizing, 7 
- Incompatible heat 
transfer medium, 6 
 
 
- Non-explosion-proof, 4 
- Static electricity, 4 
- No nitrogen blanket, 3 
 
- Static electricity, 3 
- No nitrogen blanket, 2 
- Sensor failed, 2 
- No nitrogen blanket, 2 
- Static electricity, 2 
- No nitrogen blanket, 
19 
- Static electricity, 19 
 
 
 
 
- Poor fabrication / 
construction quality, 3 
 
 - Stress concentration, 4 - Mechanical stress, 7 
- Poor fabrication/ 
construction quality, 5 
 
 
- No double & physical 
check, 3 
- Lack of analysis, 2 
- No double & physical 
check, 2 
- Not following 
procedure, 2 
 
- Not following 
procedure, 3 
- Lack of 
inspection/testing, 2 
 
- No double & physical 
check, 15 
- Lack of maintenance / 
inspection/testing, 12  
- Lack of analysis, 9 
- Not following 
procedure, 9 
 
 
 
  Various, 5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
50 
10 Method for Accident Contributor 
Identification  
 
 
Papers I - IV show that design is a major contributor to accidents. Nearly 80% of 
accidents have design as a contributor and based on other studies (Duguid, 2001; 
HSE, 2003) in 50% - 60% of these cases, it is the primary cause (Paper III). As 
discussed in the previous sections (Section 1 and 3), earlier utilization of existing 
knowledge can prevent most of these accidents. In other words, available accident 
knowledge was not fully utilized to recognize the risks. The accident databases were 
not usable in practice for the normal engineering work, since the compiled 
information was scattered and not in a user-friendly format as discussed in Chapter 3. 
Therefore, in Paper V, a design oriented accidents contributor identification method is 
proposed. The aim is to disseminate existing accident knowledge into a design for 
hazard identification in a practical way. 
 
10.1 Limitations of current design oriented methods 
 
There are several well-accepted safety analysis methods available for design as 
discussed in Chapter 4. Since most of the current safety and design review methods 
have limited applicability at the early phase of plant design project, the benefits to 
detect and eliminate the accident contributors at an early stage of plant design cannot 
be done. 
 
The existing safety review methods eliminated 80-95% of design errors (Taylor, 
2007a) but there is still a design element present in most (80%) of accidents in 
industry (Refer Paper III). Besides that,  the applicability of many existing 
safety/design methods (i.e. HAZOP, F&EI etc.) were limited in  the early phases of 
plant design due to lack of process information (Hurme and Rahman, 2005; Kidam at 
el., 2008a).  
 
HAZOP is rather effective in removing process engineering related faults but the 
problem is that HAZOP is applied typically at a time when it was too late. HAZOP is 
used when all the process design is quite ready and any process design related 
changes will be expensive. From the mechanical engineering point of view, HAZOP 
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is done too early, since detailed design has not been done or completed. For this 
reason, HAZOP lacks the lifecycle point of view. Therefore, an additional lifecycle 
based approach for enhancing process safety is needed. 
 
10.2 Method development 
 
The method for accident contributor identification of chemical processes is illustrated 
in Figure 14. The purpose of the method is to identify the accident contributors 
throughout the process lifecycle and evaluate their importance in causing accidents. 
The method consists of five main steps and the evaluation is based on process 
equipment types. Detailed description of the method is in Paper V. 
 
In Step 1, equipment type is selected.  Then in Step 2, the relevant accident 
contributors and their root causes are identified. This is based on the most frequent 
accident contributors of the equipment identified as well as their frequency of 
occurrence in the earlier CPI accidents. These include both main and sub contributors 
with their root causes as presented in Table 5 (Chapter 7.1). A detailed accident 
ranking is provided in Appendix 1 of Paper II. Next, the most frequent main 
contributors (MC) to accidents are identified by using Table 6 (Chapter 7.2). The 
main contributor of an accident is the one that triggers and plays a major role in the 
accident. Besides that, the less frequent but specific contributors are also identified. 
This identification is based on the contributors, which are much more frequent than 
average in the accidents of certain equipment types. Table 8 (Chapter 7.4) gives the 
more frequent than average contributors for each equipment type. 
 
The share as main contributor (SMC) to accident is also identified and ranked in 
Table 6. The SMC presents the capability of a contributor to cause an accident 
possibly by itself (Refer Paper I). These contributors are obviously crucial in accident 
prevention. Since SMC does not present the frequency because some of the high SMC 
contributors may rarely occur. Therefore, Paper II analyzed accident contributors 
based on both their frequency and SMC. A cluster of risky contributors was identified 
in which the contributors have both high frequency and high SMC. These high-risk 
contributors, which are frequent and often act as main-contributors are summarized in 
Table 9 (Chapter 7.5).  
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Figure 14: Flow chart of the accident contributor identification methodology (Refer 
Paper V). 
 
 
In Step 3, the detection of potential accident mechanism is carried out. As mentioned 
in Paper I and illustrated in Figure 9, (Chapter 6.5) certain accident contributors have 
a tendency to act together in accidents. At equipment level, the interconnection data 
are summarized in Table 7 Chapter 7.3) and the details are in Paper II (see Tables 5 
and 6).  
 
Quick Guide 
Table 6 
Table 14 
Table 16 
Table 5 
Table 8 
Table 6 
Table 9 
Table 7 
Detailed Guide 
Tables 4 & 6 of Paper II 
Table 1 of Paper IV 
Table 4 & Appendix 1 of 
Paper IV  
Table 1 & Appendix 1 of 
Paper II 
Table 3 of Paper II 
 
Table 4 & 6 of Paper II 
Figure 2 of Paper II 
 
Table 5 & 6 of Paper II 
Steps Procedure 
Select piece of equipment 
Potential main contributors 
Step 4: 
Design & 
operation error 
identification 
Step1: 
Equipment 
Step 3: 
Accident 
mechanism 
Step 5: 
Record keeping 
Design and operational errors  
Lifecycle stage for errors elimination 
Compile the findings and record keeping 
Most common accident contributors with 
their root causes 
Specific contributors 
High SMC contributors 
Step 2: 
Identification of 
accident 
contributors  
Risky cluster of contributors 
The interconnection of contributors  
Go to next equipment 
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Next, in Step 4, the possible design and operation errors are identified by using Table 
14. (Chapter 9.1). Identification is based on the statistical frequency of errors for 
different equipment types as presented in Appendix 1 of Paper III. Later, the design 
errors are linked to the process design lifecycle by identifying their time of occurrence 
during design and operation activities. This can be done based on the statistics on the 
frequency and time of the error, as shown in Table 16 (Chapter 9.3). The aim is to 
prevent the same errors from being repeated. In this case, the design error timing 
points out the time in the plant lifecycle when accident contributor elimination should 
be done. 
 
In the method presented in Figure 14, continuous evaluation for each design stage is 
done until accident contributors for all the process equipment and piping have been 
identified. In Step 5, the results are compiled and the accident contributors and 
improvements are listed. The design error and accident contributor statistics provide 
ideas on appropriate hazard elimination and risk reduction strategies. This can be 
done by using a hierarchy of controls such as inherently safer, add-on engineered and 
procedural levels. 
 
10.3 Method demonstration and test 
 
The method of identifying accident contributors throughout the process lifecycle is 
demonstrated and tested using the Bhopal tragedy case study presented in Paper V. 
The Bhopal gas tragedy was the worst industrial accident in the world killing over 
2000 persons immediately and injuring more than 200,000 persons in 1984 in Bhopal, 
India.  
 
In the process, methyl isocyanate (MIC) was an intermediate to produce a pesticide. 
Chemically, MIC is a toxic, reactive, volatile, and flammable substance. The MIC 
storage tank (T610) was contaminated by water through the overhead pressure 
venting system. MIC reacted with the water in an exothermic way. The reaction was 
catalyzed by rust and other compounds. A runaway reaction occurred resulting in high 
temperature, vaporization of MIC and high pressure activating a safety valve. Due to 
multiple failures of the protection system, a large amount of MIC gas leaked. The 
leaked gas spread towards the city zone covering residential areas and causing the 
casualties (Chouhan, 2005; Mannan, 2005).  
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The method of identifying accident contributors was applied to the MIC storage tank 
T610. Although T610 is a storage tank, its function, structure and operation resemble 
more than a process vessel. Therefore, the equipment types selected in Paper V to 
represent tank T610 were ‘pressure vessel’ and ‘storage tank’. Besides that, the piping 
system was also analyzed. Paper V presents the assessment steps for T610 as a 
‘process vessel’.  
 
The result of the method test for pressure vessel is summarized in Table 17. In the 
contributor category, contamination (14 cases) was the largest accident contributor 
identified. The next contributor was the reaction contributor (12 cases) with its root 
cause as unwanted reaction, due to contamination. These were largely the main 
contributors, relatively high contributors and SMCs aspects. The mechanism of 
accident proposed by the interconnection study (Step 3) was therefore: human & 
organizational – contamination – reaction – heat transfer problems.  
 
Table 17: Results of Bhopal T610 analysis as a pressure vessel 
Steps Parameters Findings 
1 Equipment types Process vessel 
2a Accident 
contributors (Table 
5) 
a. Contamination, 14 cases – flow-in, 8 cases; human/technical interface, 4 cases. 
b. Human & organizational, 12 - organizational failure, 10; no procedure/check, 3. 
c. Reaction, 12 – unwanted reaction, 9; contamination, 3. 
d. Flow related, 10 - human/technical interface, 3. 
2b Main contributors, 
MC (Table 6) 
a. Contamination, 13  
b. Flow related, 5 
c. Human & organizational, 5 
d. Heat transfer, 4 
2c Specific contributors 
(Table 8) 
a. Static electricity, 2.1 times more than average 
b. Reaction, 2.0 
c. Contamination, 1.6 
2d High share as main 
contributor, SMC 
(Table 6) 
a. Corrosion, 100% 
b. Fabrication/construction/installation, 100% 
c. Contamination, 93% 
2e Cluster analysis    
(Table 9) 
a. Contamination  
b. Flow related 
c. Heat transfer 
3 Accident mechanism 
(Table 7) 
a. Contamination – reaction, 5  
b. Heat transfer – reaction, 4 
c. Contamination – human & organizational, 3 
4a Design and operation 
faults (Table 14) 
a. Reactivity/incompatibility, 29 – reaction with contaminants, 6 
b. Protection, 19 – lack of ignition source control, 11 
c. Process condition, 15 – reaction with contaminants, 6. 
4b Lifecycle location 
(Table 16) 
a. R&D, preliminary – reaction with contaminants, 6; secondary reaction, 6; 
contamination, 6; hazardous material and heat generation, 4; high temperature, 3 
b. Basic design – physical arrangement, 3 
c. Detailed design – non-explosion proof, 4; static electricity, 4 
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Based on the findings in Table 17, the vessel based assessment strongly shows (Step 2 
- 4a) that contaminations was the major accident contributor and had a connection 
with the unwanted chemical reaction in the vessel. Furthermore, the result shows that 
these accident contributors should have been identified and controlled at  the early 
stage of design project i.e. at the research & development and preliminary engineering 
stages (Step 4b).  
 
The accident contributors were also analyzed by using equipment types ‘tank’ for the 
T610 as well as piping. The results were compared with the actual Bhopal accident 
contributors in Table 18. These were extracted from the data from Chouhan et al. 
(2004) and Chouhan (2005). The critical accident contributors for each piece of 
equipment were identified from their data and presented as the underlined frequency 
in Table 18. 
 
If the contributor is found, it would be marked X. If the finding is not at the top of the 
contributor tables, the mark would be in brackets (X). The actual critical accident 
contributors are underlined. The different critical contributors are selected for the 
piping and vessel/tank. If the contributor is not found by the method, it would be 
marked O. The non-relevant contributors to each piece of equipment analyzed are 
marked –. 
 
Piping, the relevant accident contributors and faults were found and shown in Table 
18.Following that, the accident mechanism can be predicted. In ‘tank’ analysis, the 
contamination was not found as a contributor, neither was the inventory aspect as a 
design error nor the procedures as the operating errors. For the ‘vessel’ analysis, all 
but two of the contributors were found to be weak. Besides that, neither inventory as 
design error nor procedures as operating error was found. The accident mechanism 
was only partly predicted in the tank option whereas the vessel option gave a better 
prediction.  
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Table 18: Comparison of the method results with the real accident. 
Accident causes  
Found by method 
Piping Storage tank Process vessel 
1. Contributors a. Connectivity & layout 
b. Material of construction 
c. Corrosion 
d. Flow related/Flow-in 
e. Human & organizational 
f. Contamination 
g. Heat transfer 
h. Reaction 
X 
(X) 
X 
X 
X 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
X 
X 
O 
X 
(X) 
- 
- 
- 
(X) 
X 
X 
(X) 
X 
 
2. Design 
faults  
a. Jumper line 
b. Wrong construction material 
c. Valves 
d. Contaminant/Reaction 
e. Inventory/Size 
X 
X 
(X) 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
(X) 
O 
- 
- 
- 
X 
O 
 
3. Operational 
faults 
a. Maintenance 
b. Work permits 
c. Procedures 
d. Not following procedure 
e. Training 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
(X) 
O 
X 
(X) 
(X) 
X 
O 
X 
(X) 
 
4. Accident 
mechanism  
- Human & organizational (HO) 
- Layout (L) 
- Flow related (F) 
- Contamination (C) 
- Reaction (R) 
- Heat transfer (H) 
- Material of construction (M) 
 
L - HO: strong 
L - C: strong 
L - F: strong 
F - HO: strong 
M - C: strong 
(L –R): weak 
F - HO: strong 
H - HO: moderate 
C - R: strong 
H - R: strong 
C - HO: moderate 
Note: X = high frequency;   (X) = low frequency;   - = not relevant;   O = did not found;  underlined = actual critical contributors 
 
 
Table 19 summarizes the prediction capability of the method.. Piping can best be 
predicted with an average of 95% accuracy. The storage tank option has the least 
prediction capability at approximately 50%, because T610 is not a normal storage 
tank. The average prediction capability is 86% for piping and vessel, and 75% if the 
tank is included as an option. The accident contributors are the best predicted aspects 
with 90% to 100% accuracy. 
 
Table 19: Comparison of predicted accident parameters with the actual parameters 
(%) 
Accident parameters 1) Piping system 
2) Process 
vessel 
3) Storage 
tank 
Average 
1&2 
Average 1, 2 
& 3 
Contributors 100 100 70 100 90 
Design faults  85 50 30 68 55 
Operational faults 100 60 60 80 73 
Accident mechanism  90 75 50 83 72 
Critical contributor (underlined in Table 
18)
100 100 50 100 83 
Average 95 77 52 86 75 
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The identification method proposed has several advantages that could overcome some 
of the limitations of the current design/safety methods. However, the proposed 
method is not meant to substitute, but to supplement the existing methods used in the 
design phase. The most important feature of the method is that it identifies accident 
contributors and potential design and operation errors as well as gives the designer 
ideas on their removal potential accident contributors throughout a design project. The 
safety analysis can start early and hazards be controlled earlier in the plant lifecycle 
by utilizing the inner layers of protection. As a result, cost and safety benefits can be 
achieved as a result of early process design changes.  
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11 Corrective Actions Analysis  
 
 
Paper VI discusses the corrective actions proposed in accident reports after the 
accidents. The 364 CPI-related accident cases available in the FKD database were 
studied. 15 cases were classified as unknown because of insufficient information.  
 
11.1 Hierarchy of control 
 
Corrective actions of the accident report was analyzed to find out the risk reduction 
strategies proposed to prevent accidents. It was found that the CPI normally took 
several corrective actions due to multiple causes of accident. In this analysis only 
single corrective actions were counted and the actions were classified according to the 
priority of risk management strategy: inherently safer > passive > active > procedural 
(see Chapter 2.4). Analysis of known cases (349 cases) showed that the corrective 
actions taken were about equally shared between procedural (53%) and engineered 
(47%). In the engineered strategy, 18% of them were categorized as an inherently 
safer, followed by active engineered (16%), and passive engineered (13%).  
 
The results can be compared with the work done by Amyotte et al. (2011) who 
investigated the hierarchy of control by analyzing 62 accident cases from Chemical 
Safety and Hazard Investigation Board (CSB) database. As shown in Table 20, they 
found a higher share (36%) of inherently safer category, which is double the result of 
the present study. The reasons for this difference may be due to the analysis done and 
the database used. CSB database covers relatively new accidents in the USA whereas 
FKD database includes both old and new (1964-2003) accidents nearly all from 
Japan. Since the uptake of the inherent safety was slow in the earlier stage (Gupta and 
Edwards, 2002), the time of accident may have an effect on the corrective action 
recommended in the accident report. In the USA, ISD is better known and even 
required by some counties as an accident prevention strategy.  
 
Table 20: Corrective actions taken by CPI to prevent accidents 
Hierarchy of control Amyotte et al. (2011), % Paper VI, % Average, % Cumulative, % 
Inherently safer 36 18 27 27 
Passive 8 13 10.5 37.5 
Active 14  16 15 52.5 
Procedural 42 53 47.5 100 
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The results reflect the transition from the earlier accident prevention strategies, which 
are mostly procedural as part of the ISD based strategy. There are increases ranging 
from 18% to 36%. It is noteworthy that accident reports in FKD database proposed 
approximately 50% procedural improvements, even though the share of design errors 
is about 80% of accidents based on Paper III. This could be due to the design changes 
which are more costly compared to procedural changes.  
 
11.2 Inherent safety keywords 
 
The usage of inherent safety keywords were also analyzed (Refer Paper IV). 18% of 
accidents were corrected by using ISD strategy. The corrective actions were classified 
into six main ISD keywords presented in Table 21. The distribution of the keywords 
used to prevent accidents is presented in Figure 15. The usage of the ISD based on 
keywords is led by moderation and error tolerance keywords (27% for both); followed 
by substitute (21%), simplify (13%), minimize (10%), and limitation of effects (2%).  
 
Table 21: Inherent safety keywords used and their strategy to manage risk 
 
27%
27%
21%
13%
10%
2%
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18
Error Tolerance
Moderate
Substitute
Simplify
Minimize
Limit of Effect
No. of cases  
Figure 15: Inherent safety corrective actions taken by the CPI based on ISD 
keywords. 
Keywords ISD strategy 
Minimize Design a process or equipment that uses smaller quantities of hazardous substances with limited energy generation capabilities. 
Substitute Avoid hazardous substances or processes and if not applicable, replace with a less hazardous one. 
Moderate Select safer process conditions (i.e. temperature, pressure and concentration) and chemical handling mechanism (i.e. safer physical form and mode of operation). 
Simplify Design a process, equipment or system that is simple, user friendly and easy to operate. 
Error tolerance 
Designing reliable and robust (i.e. chemically, mechanically and physically) 
process equipment and its piping system that resist misuse, mal-operation, poor 
maintenance, and process deviations/changes. 
Limitation of 
effect 
Design a process or equipment based on worst-case scenario that protects and 
mitigates the process hazards by default if an unwanted event occurs. 
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Based on the results of ISD usage in corrective actions of accidents, a fishbone 
diagram (Figure 16) was developed to illustrate the accident prevention through ISD 
keywords (Kidam et al., 2008b). The fishbone can be used as an idea generation for 
applying ISD principles into practice.  
 
As seen from Figure 16, the error tolerance keyword shows that the majority of 
actions have been taken to solve the design related errors such as wrong material 
selections, etc. Another aspect to be considered is the tolerance to operation or 
maintenance errors and designing a fail-safe system.  
 
Meanwhile, the moderation strategy mainly aims to change the existing processing 
conditions to milder ones by manipulating the temperature, pressure, concentration 
and the physical state of the chemicals. Common applications are refrigeration, 
dilution and decreasing the chemical reactivity by operating at low temperature or low 
pressure, or introducing the inhibitor and stabilizer agents.  
 
The substitute keyword is to lessen the hazards by using safer or compatible 
chemicals. Simplification can be achieved by creating highly reliable systems (no 
redundancy needed) and simpler process (in terms of complexity and interaction 
between units). Minimization can be achieved by intensifying the operation (low 
inventory etc.). Limiting the effects would often minimize impacts caused by passive 
measures (i.e. robust and separate systems).   
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Minimize 
Error ToleranceLimit of Effects 
Substitute Moderate
Simplify
Accident 
Prevention 
Combined equipment 
Few types of stocks or spare parts 
In-situ 
operation 
Simple technology 
(process & equipment) 
Simpler control 
system
Resistance to process 
condition 
Safer work method 
Safer process option 
Safer physical state 
Material of construction 
Stronger or robust 
system 
Defect free 
Small flow or pipe size 
Segregate or isolated 
system 
Redundant system 
Small inventory
High conversion
Intensify mixing 
Low energy or power 
Continuous processes 
Increase safety margin
Non reactive
No aerosol 
formation
No seal or gland
Use same solvent
Inhibitor or 
stabilizer
Non-flammable & non-toxic
Decrease reactivity 
potential
Type of reactor
Lower temperature
Smaller 
equipment
Lower 
pressure
Dilute
Shorter 
processing time
Refrigeration
Avoid accumulation
Easy start-up & 
shutdown
Fail safe system
No or less moving parts
Low failure rate
See-through or transparent
On-line sampling
No cleaning 
required
Same level positioning
Free maintenance
Unmanned operation
Fail slowly
Resistance to internal 
& external factor
Safe distance
Fixed system
Thermal insulation
Low leaking rate
Figure 16: Fishbone diagram of accident prevention through ISD. 
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12 Discussion and Conclusion 
 
 
The accident rate has not been decreasing in the CPI. However almost all the 
accidents (>95%) do have known causes and could have been prevented by using 
existing knowledge (Drogaris, 1993; Mannan et al., 2010). This shows that the 
existing knowledge was not used effectively because the same type of accidents 
recurred. 
 
Learning from past accidents would be a powerful way of reducing accidents. After 
major accidents that happened in 1970s and 1980s, accident databases were created to 
disseminate accident information. Their usage has not been effective because of the 
presentation of accidents as case studies. Their knowledge should be analyzed and 
presented for higher level general conclusions. This has been done to some extent 
(e.g. Duguid, 1993) but lacks further analysis e.g. such as contributors on equipment 
level, their interconnections, presence of design errors and their timing. This should 
be done especially for the systematic use of accident information in design because 
this part of the analysis has been neglected.  
 
 The aim of this thesis is enhance experience feedback on design by increasing the 
general usability of the accident information. This is done by analyzing further, 
drawing general conclusions and creating an approach for its utilization during design 
for enhancement of safety in CPI. The role of design in accident prevention is done by 
analyzing the FKB database and studying it from four view points: 1) analysis of 
contributors of accidents and which equipment had the accident and why, 2) design 
and operating errors and what was designed or operated wrong, 3) timing of the 
errors, and 4) proposed corrective actions after the accidents.  
 
The contributors were divided into three main categories: 1) technical contributors, 2) 
‘purely’ human and organizational faults at the operation stage, and 3) external 
factors.  The aim was to see which accident contributors was design related. Therefore 
the design category included all the contributors, which were related to the design 
stage and technical aspects, human & organizational faults in design, faults in 
operator-technical interface, and in designed procedures.  
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It was found that the share of technical accident contributors was dominant (79% of 
contributors). The result supported the average result published earlier which was 
75% for technical contributors (Sales et al., 2007 and Drogaris 1993), when the same 
classification was used. The result shows that majority of the accidents could be 
affected by changes in the design stage. This is more apparent in the main 
contributors to accidents, which were found to be 83% caused by technical problems.  
 
To utilize accident contributor information in accident prevention, their relative 
importance needs to be known. This can be based on various criteria; 1) contributor 
frequency, 2) main contributor frequency, 3) the contributors share as main 
contributor (SMC), 4) equipment specific contributors, 5) combination of high SMC 
and frequency (cluster 1 contributors). This is based on the idea that the role of main 
contributors is essential and they are capable of causing accidents by themselves 
although there are typically several contributors to an accident. The sub-contributors 
have a supportive role only. 
 
The thesis is able to identify the contributors in general and specifically for each of 
the six most common equipment types studied. These six equipment types represented 
approximately 80% of all accidents. The most common contributors found in general 
were human & organizational (19%), process contaminations (11%), flow-related 
aspects (11%), and heat transfer (10%). 
 
In addition, the mechanism of accident needs to be eliminated. The interconnection of 
main and sub-contributors can be used for this purpose. These interconnections were 
analyzed in general as compared to the six equipment types which were specifically 
studied in the thesis. 
 
Another point to be reviewed is the design and operation errors by looking at what 
was designed or operated wrongly and when the error was done. A broad definition of 
design error was used here whereby if the accident report proposed changes in process 
or its designed procedures, the design error would be considered to have occurred.  
 
The study found that about 80% of the accident cases were contributed by at least one 
design error. This finding was higher than the ones found in the earlier studies which 
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was 70% (Drogaris, 1993 and HSE, 2003). This could be due to the design oriented 
point of view of the study and the depth of the analysis. Majority of the accidents 
have more than one design error and the average design errors was 2.3 errors present 
per accident. The most common design error classes found were related to poor 
layout, followed by poor consideration of chemical reactivity & incompatibility and 
wrong process conditions selected. The most common underlying causes were process 
contaminations, physical arrangement, and reactions with contaminants. 
 
The timing of the errors was analyzed by determining the time of the design decision, 
which caused the accident in a typical design project time schedule. It was found that 
nearly half (47%) of the design and operation errors were made in process design-
oriented stages, one fourth (26%) in detailed engineering, and one fifth (20%) in 
operation.  Process contaminants, reactions with them and secondary reactions were 
the most significant accident contributors in the early phase for nearly all types of 
equipment. The number of design errors done per design aspect was the largest in the 
preliminary design indicating that many errors were done in the fundamental process 
design decisions such as process conditions, chemicals and reactions involved. This 
clearly indicates that more focus should be given on these decisions at the early phase 
of the design to enhance safety. The most frequent errors and their timing were 
identified for each equipment type. This knowledge can be utilized by focusing on the 
hazard analysis in each stage of the most error-prone features of design. A points-to-
look list was created for this purpose. 
 
The corrective actions in accident reports were studied by analyzing which risk 
management strategy was proposed.  It was found that the current approach of loss 
prevention mainly utilized the outer layers of protection, which were organizational 
and human-oriented. The most commonly proposed corrective actions after an 
accident were procedural changes (53% of cases) even the analysis of the background 
reasons showed that the design errors were generally dominant (80% of causes of 
accidents). The inherently safer design was proposed in 18% of the cases. More recent 
results by Amyotte et al. (2011) from CSB database found a higher share (36%) of 
ISD and less procedural corrective actions (42%). This may be because of the wide 
spread knowledge of ISD in USA lately. Generally, procedural corrective actions 
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were probably proposed because of their lower cost as compared to the engineering 
changes.  
The ISD corrective actions proposed were studied in more detail based on which 
inherent safety keyword was adopted. It was found that the most used principles were 
’error tolerance’ and ‘moderate’ (27% each). Keywords ‘substitute’, ‘simplify’ and 
‘minimize’ were not commonly used. This is probably because of the late application 
of ISD i.e. after the accident. Therefore, it was not possible to do large changes to the 
process at this stage. This is based on the results of ISD usage as a corrective action 
illustrated in the fishbone diagram that was created to aid in the hazard reduction 
through ISD keywords. 
 
The aim of the thesis is to transform the accident report information into practical 
applications by analyzing it and creating an approach that can be used for supporting 
the design activities. This transformation is needed, since the current design-oriented 
safety methods have limitations in their capability. They have not utilized the 
knowledge available from the earlier accidents and therefore did not enable 
knowledge cycle. As a result, similar accidents recur. The previous methods do not 
support the designer during the design work, since they lack the design lifecycle point 
of view. For example, HAZOP is typically utilized as a final check after the process 
design is completed. No significant design changes can be made at this point due to 
economic factors. Therefore, the cost benefits of making early changes are lost and 
most of the risk reduction is achieved by using add-on safety systems, which tend to 
complicate the process. 
 
The restrictions in the traditional method pointed out the need for a new method to 
support the design process. The thesis presents a method for identifying accident 
contributors as well as design and operation errors. The method includes their causes 
and the timing of creation. The identification is done by using several techniques 
based on accident contributor and design error statistics presented earlier in the thesis. 
The identification is based on the most frequent accident contributors, main 
contributors and uncommon but specific contributors, which are capable of causing 
accidents by themselves. The accident mechanism is analyzed through the 
interconnection of contributors. Statistically, the most potential design and operation 
errors and their lifecycle timing are pointed out and shown in the design stage, where 
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action should be taken to eliminate the accident contributor. The method should be 
used to complement existing methods such as HAZOP and not as an alternative. 
 
The proposed method has been demonstrated and tested using the Bhopal tragedy case 
study. The method successfully identified the accident contributors, pointed out 
common design and operating errors and the time when design improvements should 
be implemented during the process lifecycle. The proposed method can predict up to 
85% of accident contributors, and design and operation errors if the type of equipment 
is selected correctly. Selection of equipment may be the main problem with the 
method especially when the process includes unconventional or novel types of 
equipment as there is no an earlier accident information available.  
 
In conclusion, the thesis has presented new knowledge on the statistics of equipment 
based accident contributors, their background, the design errors involved and their 
timing and proposed a method for extended experience feedback to improve the 
dissemination of accident knowledge. The results confirmed that there is a high 
number of design based errors in accidents (approximately 80%), which can be 
removed (about 50%) by improved process design. The proposed method utilizes 
knowledge on accident contributors from earlier accidents by presenting a new 
method to eliminate accidents since the accident based information was not utilized 
systematically in earlier designs. Besides that, the design lifecycle point of view is 
novelty which makes it possible to start hazard identification in the early stages. The 
proposed method would lead to cost and safety benefits that can be achieved as a 
result of early process design changes. Figure 16 summarizes briefly the 
characteristics of chemical process design and their connections to accident 
contributors in the process lifecycle. 
 
The limitation of the research presented is related to the source of accident 
knowledge, i.e. the database used. Even though the number of cases is large, there 
may have been distortion dues to the origin of accidents, which are mostly from one 
country. The Japanese chemical industry may not represent the world CPI average. 
Most of the study focused on to the six most common equipment types in accidents, 
which correspond to 80% of accident cases. Focusing on these equipment types may 
to a certain extent affect the generalization of the results. It is recommended that 
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similar studies using other databases be carried out. Besides that, the effect of time of 
accidents on the contributors involved should also be studied since many safety 
efforts on this aspect have been taken in CPI during the last decade. 
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The accident rate has not been decreasing in 
the chemical process industry although 
almost all the accidents (>95%) do have 
known causes and could have been 
prevented by using existing knowledge. This 
shows that the existing knowledge was not 
used effectively to prevent accidents. The 
aim of the thesis is to transform the accident 
report information into practical 
applications by analyzing it and creating an 
approach that can be used for supporting the 
design activities. 
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